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THE IRONY OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION TODAY: 
WHY DO BROKERAGE FIRMS NEED JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION? 
Barbara Black· 
In 1987 the securities industry achieved a major victory. Until then, 
because of the Supreme Court's 1953 holding in Wzlko v. Swan I that 
agreements to arbitrate federal securities claims contained in customer 
agreements were unenforceable, customers could sue brokerage firms 
and their salespersons in court, frequently before juries amenable to 
sizable verdicts, including punitive damages. Success came first in 
Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, Inc. 2 and then, two years later, 
in Rodriguez:. de Qyijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 3 As a result of these 
two decisions, brokerage firms could require customers to arbitrate all 
disputes, even federal securities claims, in industry-sponsored arbitration 
forums. 
The securities industry brought its arbitration campaign at the right 
time. McMahon and Rodriguez:. marked the perfect alignment of two 
strong Supreme Court policies: support for arbitration4 and antipathy 
toward investors' claims for securities damages in federal court.5 Many 
commentators initially viewed these decisions as a defeat for investors.6 
• James D. Hopkins Professor of Law and Co-Director, Securities Arbitration Clinic, Pace 
University School of Law. B.A. Barnard,J.D. Columbia. lowe thanks to Lisa De Bock, Pace '05, for her 
excellent research assistance and to my colleaguesJamesJ. Fishman and Jill I. Gross for their thoughtful 
comments. Special thanks to Vicky Gannon of the Pace Law Library for her unfailing diligence and 
resourcefulness over the years in tracking down sources. 
I. 346 U.S. 427,438 (1953), ot'muled", Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ American Exp., Inc., 490 
U.S. 477 (1989). 
2. 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (holding that claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) could 
be arbitrated). 
3. 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (holding that claims under Securities Act of 1933 could be arbitrated). 
4. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 10 (I 984} (stating that Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) "declared a national policy favoring arbitration"}. 
5. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (excluding corporate 
mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty claims from Rule JOb-5 coverage because of concerns of 
vexatious litigation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,214 n.33 (1976) (requiring scienter to limit 
class of plaintiffs who can sue under Rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v.I\Ianor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
739-40 (1975) (restricting standing under Rule 10b-5 because of "widespread recognition that litigation 
under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which 
accompanies litigation in general"). 
6. The following statement by Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in McMahon, expresses 
this view: "[t]he Court thus approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolution of claims 
under the Exchange Act and leaves such claims to the arbitral forum of the securities industry at a time when 
the industry's abuses towards investors are more apparent than ever." 482 U.S. at 243. Investors' advocates 
urged Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. See, e.g., McMahon Decision Should be 01:ertumed /0 
Protect Investors, Houre Panel Told, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 31, 1988). 
415 
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Mter McMahon, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
recognized the need to reform the arbitration process to meet the 
expectations of unhappy investors whose disputes would now be heard 
before the industry's arbitration forums. Working with the Securities 
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICAr and the Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs),8 the SEC instituted reforms to make the 
securities arbitration forums fairer and more neutral, 9 a process that still 
continues. Today investors may find arbitration preferable to litigation, 
particularly since their claims frequently are stronger on the equities 
than on the law. 10 
Illustrating a classic example of "be careful what you wish for," 
brokerage firms no longer find arbitration entirely to their liking. 
Increasingly they turn to the courts to resist arbitration, to interfere with 
ongoing arbitration, or to undo the results of arbitration. The Supreme 
Court has twice thwarted these attempts, adhering to its pro-arbitration 
policy and reaching decisions that favor the investor. Despite these 
decisions, brokerage firms continue to send their lawyers to the 
courthouse. Unfortunately, as a result, both federal and state courts are 
becoming increasingly involved in the securities arbitration process to 
the detriment of investors. 
This Article argues that increased judicial involvement in the 
securities arbitration process is unwarranted. Although there are 
legitimate concerns about the use of arbitration to resolve consumer and 
employment disputes in lieu of litigation, the SRO arbitration process 
fares well when measured by the components identified as necessary for 
a fair arbitration. To the extent there are issues about the fairness of the 
SRO arbitration forums, it is the investor, not the brokerage firm or 
brokers, who has reason to be concerned. 
Part I of this Article reviews the post-McMahon/Rodriguez Supreme 
Court decisions that are pro-arbitration and pro-investor. Part II 
discusses lower court decisions in which firms or individual brokers have 
sought to enjoin or interfere with the arbitration of investors' disputes. 
Part III looks at lower court decisions in which firms or individual 
brokers have sought to vacate arbitration awards in favor of investors. 
7. SICA, consisting of representatives of the SROs, the public, and the Securities Industry 
Association (SIA), developed and continues to revise a Uniform Code of Arbitration. For background on 
SICA, see Constantine N. Katsoris, SIC4: The First Twenry rears, 23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 483, 488-90 (1996). 
8. SROs are defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1994), and include the 
national securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the largest 
SRO. 
9. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As ~ Go Along: The Role if Law in Securities 
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 999-1005 (2002). 
10. /d. at 1035-1040. 
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Part IV examines whether the securities arbitration forums provide 
customers with a fair process, and it argues that increased judicial 
involvement is not necessary to ensure fairness and, in fact, works to the 
detriment of investors. The Article concludes that courts, in the face of 
brokerage firms' propensity to involve them in arbitration, may be 
exhibiting anti-arbitration, or even anti-investor, tendencies. Courts 
should heed the Supreme Court's message and resist brokers' attempts 
to defeat arbitration's goal of "fair and expeditious resolution" of 
disputes. II 
PART ONE 
Two post-McMahon/Rodriguez Supreme Court decisions involving 
customer-broker disputes establish the Court's pro-arbitration and pro-
investor slant. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,I2 the 
brokerage firm moved to vacate the punitive damages portion of an 
arbitration award, asserting that the arbitrators had no authority to 
award them. The customer agreement contained a New York choice 
oflaw clause, and at that time New York law did not allow arbitrators 
to award punitive damages. 13 Reversing the lower federal courts' 
decisions in favor of the firm, the Supreme Court held that the New 
York choice oflaw clause did not clearly establish the parties' intent to 
adopt the New York limitation on arbitrators' powers. Significandy, the 
Court did not base its opinion solely on technical grounds of contract 
interpretation, but also on its pro-arbitration policy that "due regard 
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities 
as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of 
arbitration." 14 
Mastrobuono setded the question of arbitrators' authority to award 
punitive damages, an ironic outcome given that one of the principal 
attractions of arbitration to the securities industry was to avoid punitive 
II. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,85 (2002). 
12. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
13. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976). While the New York Court 
of Appeals has not yet overruled Gani9, most Appellate Division courts have abandoned the Gam!>, rule and 
allow punitive damages awards. Set, e.g., Americorp Sec., Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (1st Dept. 
1997). 
14. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland StanfordJunior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468,476 (1989)). 
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damages. Strong industry opposition to punitive damages continues, (j 
as I later discuss. 16 
The second decision, Howsam v. Dean Witter Rrynolds, Inc., 17 resolved a 
conflict among the circuits involving the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) Dispute Resolution'sl8 six-year eligibility rule, 
which bars arbitration of stale claims. 19 Mter McMahon and Rodrigue;:" 
firms regularly asked courts· to enjoin customers' arbitration on the 
ground that the claims were time-barred under the applicable SRO's 
eligibility rule. The circuit courts were evenly divided on the character-
ization of the eligibility rule: did it raise a question of arbitrability that 
the court must decide, or was it analogous to a statute oflimitations that 
the arbitrators could decide?20 
In Howsam, the Court rejected the former view and limited the scope 
of arbitrability to questions 
where contracting parties would likely have expected a court to have 
decided the gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought 
that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, conse-
quently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the 
risk offorcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have 
agreed to arbitrate.21 
The Court easily concluded that since the firm's customer agreement 
provided for arbitration before the NASD, the parties would expect that 
the arbitrators would decide procedural questions like NASD's own time 
limit rule. 
Both Howsam and Mastrobuono reject the brokerage firms' attempts to 
limit arbitrators' powers. Moreover, Howsam contains a broader mess-
15. See SECURITIFS ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OFTHEARBITRATION PoUCy TASK FORCE 
TO THE BOARD OF Go VERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OFSECURITlFS DEALERS, INC. 36-38 (1996) for 
a summary of the industry's arguments. 
16. For post-Maslrobuono challenges to punitive damages awards, see infia notes 153-59 and accom-
panying text. 
17. 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
18. In July 2000 the NASD spun off its subsidiary, the NASD Regulation Office of Dispute 
Resolution, as a new company, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., to administer NASD dispute resolution 
services. See Press Release, NASD Dispute Resolution, NASD Launches New Dispute Resolution Subsidiary 
Guly 17,2000), m:ailableat hup:1 Iwww.nasdadr.com/news/pr2000/ne_sectionOO_160.html(last visitedJune 
25, 2003). For simplicity's sake I refer throughout to the NASD's dispute resolution office as NASD. 
19. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, Rule 10304 (2003), 
lWaiJableathup:1 Iwww.nasdadr.com/arb_code/arb_code.asp(lastvisitedJune 23, 2003) [hereinafter NASD 
CODE 2003]. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has a similar rule, see NYSEDEPT. OF ARBITRATION, 
ARTICLE XI AND NYSE CONSTITUTION AND ARBITRATION RULFS, Rule 603, at 8 (2003), lWailable at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Rules.pdfnast visited June 25, 2003) [hereinafter NYSE 2003]. 
20. For background, see Barbara Black, SecuriJies Arbitration Is .Nol Supposed To & So ComplicaJed: 
Arbilrabiliry, the Eligibi1iry Rule, and H-7Iose Low Decides, 30 SEC. REG. LJ. 134, 140-42 (2002). 
21. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79,83-84. 
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age: the importance of minimizing judicial involvement in the arbitra-
tion process in order to promote the goal of "a fair and expeditious 
resolution of the underlying controversy.,,22 Both of these decisions are 
pro-arbitration and pro-investor. The law has come a long way since 
McMahon and Rodriguez. 
PART Two 
As Howsam illustrates, brokerage firms frequendy go to court to enjoin 
pending arbitrations on grounds that they have not agreed to arbitrate 
the dispute or that arbitration is inappropriate for some other reason. 
In extreme instances they have even sought judicial intervention, not to 
contest arbitration, but to challenge an arbitration panel's procedural 
ruling.23 National Planning v. Achatl4 is a particularly egregious example 
of judicial intervention. In Achatz, a firm initially was successful in 
persuading a federal district court to dissolve an arbitration panel 
because it failed to return its list of proposed arbitrators to NASD on 
time. Only after the case was transferred to another district did the 
second court order the arbitration to proceed with the panel as it was 
originally constituted. 
In too many instances courts have uncritically accepted brokers' 
assertions that the disputed issue involves a question of arbitrability that 
courts should decide, rather than dismissing the lawsuit and allowing the 
arbitrators to resolve it. This section examines some of these recurring 
situations. 
Arbitrabiliry 
Since "arbitration is a matter of contract,,,25 a dispute about whether 
there is an agreement to arbitrate raises a question of arbitrability that 
ordinarily courts should decide. In disputes arising out of ordinary 
customer-broker relationships, however, there is ordinarily no question 
that the matter is arbitrable, because of brokerage firms' nearly univer-
sal use of pre dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements.26 
22. /d. at 85. 
23. See, e.g., Gruntal & Co. v. l\Iaha raj , 13 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying finn's 
application for a TRO staying a scheduled hearing after arbitrators denied finn's adjournment request). 
24. No. 02-CV-0196E(SR}, 2002 WL 31906336 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2002). 
25. Howstun, 537 U.S. at 83 (citation omitted); see alm first Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 
938, 943 (1995). 
26. Courts have enforced PDAAs even in situations where the individual broker engaged in massive 
fraud over a substantial period of time, including stealing money from customers' accounts. See Fazio v. 
Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003); Deputy v. Lehman Bros., 2003 WL 22227977 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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As part of the post-McMahon/Rodriguez reforms, the NASD imposes 
requirements on the content and form of predispute arbitration 
agreements, including a statement that the parties are waiving their right 
to seek remedies in court.27 While this language was principally 
designed to provide notice to customers of the rights they are giving up, 
the language contractually commits the brokerage firms as well. The 
NASD makes this even clearer by its prohibition on any term in the 
customer agreement that limits or contradicts its rules, limits the ability 
of a party to fIle an arbitration claim, or limits the arbitrators' ability to 
make an award.28 Firms sometimes overlook the significance of this 
language.29 
Even if they have not signed a predispute arbitration agreement, 
customers can demand arbitration3o because SRO rules offer them the 
option to arbitrate.31 NASD Rule 10301 32 provides that a customer can 
demand arbitration of any eligible claim between it and "a member 
and/ or associated person33 arising in connection with the business of 
such member or in connection with the activities of such associated 
person." The NYSE34 rule is broader than the NASD's and provides 
that anyone, whether a customer or not, can demand arbitration of any 
dispute between it and "a member ... and/or associated person arising 
27. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CO~UCT RULES, Rule 3110(1)(1), Books and Records 
(Requirements J!lhen Using Predispute Arbitration Agreements WUh Customers) (2003), fWai/able at 
http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/NASD_Rules (last visited June 26, 2003) (hereinafter NASD CbNDUCT 
2003]. 
28. /d. at (1)(4). See also Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by 
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the American 
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 
Fed. Reg. 21144, 21154(Exchange Act Release No. 34-26805)(May 16, I 989)(" [t]his provision makes dear 
that the use of arbitration for the resolution ofinvestor/broker-dealer disputes represents solely a choice of 
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution"); NASD Notice to Members 89-58, Amendment re: Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses in Cus/omu Agreements, 1989 WL 931 069 (National/Federal) (Aug. 1989) (calling the attention 
of its members to the provision). 
29. See NASD Notice to Members 95-16, Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements, 1995 WL 
1712330 (NationaI/Federal) (l\-lar. 1995) (alerting its members that some members' customer agreements 
contain prohibited restrictions). 
30. See Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 41 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
a customer can require a broker to arbitrate, even though the arbitration clause had been stricken from the 
customer's agreement). 
31. See, e.g., Pa. Merch. Groupv. Schultz, No. CIV.A.96-8443, 1997 WL 71428, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
13, 1997); Hanney v. Taylor, No. 121349/00,2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 761, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 
2001). 
32. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 1030 I. 
33. An "associated person" is broadly defined in Section 3(a)(IB) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)( IB), 
and includes partners, officers, directors, branch managers, controlling persons, and employees (except those 
performing solely clerical or ministerial tasks) of broker-dealers. 
34. See NYSE 2003, supra note 19; NYSE Const., Art. XI, § I, at I; Rule 600(a) at 2. 
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in connection with the business of such member ... and/ or associated 
person in connection with his activities as an associated person." 
Notwithstanding the inclusiveness of these rules, brokerage firms may 
contest their application to a particular dispute when an investor seeks 
arbitration. In resisting arbitration before the NASD, the firm typically 
argues that the investor is not a "customer;,,35 in resisting arbitration 
before the NYSE, the firm argues that the dispute does not involve 
"exchange business." 36 These disputes present two questions: (1) who 
should decide the arbitrability issue, the courts or the arbitrators, and (2) 
how should the arbitrability issue be decided? 
The Supreme Court addressed both issues in First Options oj Chicago, 
Inc. v. Kaplan.37 As to the first issue, the Supreme Court cautioned that 
"[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e], evidence that 
they did SO.,,38 Because the parties might not have considered the 
"rather arcane,,39 question of who would decide the arbitrability issue, 
a more explicit expression of intent on this question is necessary so that 
unwilling parties are not forced to arbitrate a matter they reasonably 
would expect a judge to decide.40 On the second issue, First Options 
affirmed the principle that arbitration agreements are to be interpreted 
broadly, and "[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.,,41 
35. NASD Rule 1030 I does not define "customer." There are two definitions of "customer" in other 
NASD rules: General Provisions Rule 0 120(g) defines "customer" as not including a broker or dealer, Set 
NAT'L AsS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, GEN. PROVISIONS, Rule 0120(g), D¢nitions (2003), ll1.'ailnhle at 
http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/NAASD_Rules(last visitedJune 26, 2003); Conduct Rule 2270(b) defines 
"customer" as "any person who, in the regular course of such member's business, has cash or securities in 
the possession of such member," Set NASDCONDUCT2003, supra note 27, Rule 2270(b),Disclosure,!!Finaru:in1 
Condition /0 Customers. Set, e.g, Fleet &ston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. "Innovex, Inc., 264 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 
200 I), where the coun relied on the latter rule and found that a company could not arbitrate a dispute 
involving advice provided by the firm about a merger. 
36. See, e.g., Spear, Leeds & Kellogg \'. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(holding that an alleged victim of a NYSE member's fraud can arbitrate a dispute over "exchange-related 
business," even though there is no relationship between \;ctim and firm). Spear, Leeds leaves open whether, 
when a NYSE member is accused of wrongdoing, the claim is arbitrable even if it does not arise from 
"exchange-related" business. Compare FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02-C4786, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
493 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 13,2003), '!!I'd and rmuuukd, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23086 (2d Cir. Nov. 12,2003) 
(holding that a buyer of a NYSE member's securities business could not arbitrate a contractual dispute, since 
it was not "exchange-related" business). 
37. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
38. ld. at 944 (citation omitted). 
39. ld. at 945. 
40. /d. 
41. ld. at 944-45 (quoting J\-Ioses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. \·.IVlercury Const. COlP, 460 U.S. 1,24-25 
(1983)). 
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I now examine three categories of cases where brokerage firms or 
their principals challenge arbitrability: definition of "customer," fraudu-
lent conveyance, and successor-in-interest liability. While courts gener-
ally have appropriately adopted an expansive view of arbitrability (with 
one notable exception, successor-in-interest liability), it is striking that 
courts have decided uniformly (frequendy without discussion) that they, 
not arbitrators, decide whether the matter is arbitrable. 
Definition of "Customer" 
Four recurring fact patterns illustrate difficulties with determining 
who is a "customer" under SRO rules: (I) the investor did business with 
an "associated person" of the firm, who, instead of opening an account 
for the customer with the firm, misappropriated the funds;42 (2) the 
investor did business with an "associated person" of the firm, but the dis-
pute did not involve an account or business with the firm;43 (3) the 
investor had an account with the firm, but a person who was not 
associated with the firm made all the investment decisions;44 (4) the 
investor did business with a person who was not associated with the 
firm, who in turn transacted business with the firm.45 The courts have 
42. Arbitrable: see, e.g., Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1995). 
43. Arbitrable: Ste, e.g., WMA Sec. v. Wynn, 32 Fed. Appx. 726, 729 (6th Cir. 2002); Vestax Sec. 
Corp. v.l\kWood, 280 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 2002);John Hancock Life Ins. Co. \'. Wilson, 254 F.3d 
48,59-60 (2d Cir. 2001); Wash. Square Sec. \'. Hicks, 271 F. Supp. 2d \058 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Jefferson 
Pilot Sec. Corp. v. Blankenship, 257 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Wash. Square Sec. \'. Aune, 
253 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (W.O. N.C. 2003); MONY Sec. Corp. v. Bomstein, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003); Smith v. Banolini, 2003 WL 21148940 (N.D. III. May 2003); Fin. Network Inv. Corp. v. 
Thielbar, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14889 (N.D. III. Aug. 2003); Wash. Square Sec. v. Sowers, 218 F. Supp. 
2d 1108, 1117-18 (D. Minn. 2002); Multi-Fin. Sec. Corp. v. Brown, 2002 WL 32130291 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
2002); Fin. Network Inv. Corp. v. Becker, 741 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002),qfJ'ti, 762 N.Y.S.2d 25 
(N.Y.A.D. I Dept. 2003); BMA Fin. Servo v. Guin, 164 F. Supp. 2d 813, 821 (W.O. La. 200 I); First Montauk 
Sec. Corp. v. Four Mile Ranch Dev. Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Ha. 1999); Lehman Bros. \'. 
Cenified Reponing Co., 939 F. Supp. 1333, 1340-41 (N.D. III. 1996) (decided under NYSE Rule 600); 
Royal Alliance Assoc. v. Davis, 897 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
Not arbitrable (not enough to be customers of "associated person"; investors must be "customers" 
of firm): see, e.g., MONY Sec. Corp. v. Vasquez, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ha. 2002); Investors 
Capital Corp. v. Brown, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
To some eouns, it depends on whether the customer thought the person was associated with the 
firm: see, e.g., Investors Capital Corp. \'. Rimmler, No. 600CV10920RL22DAB, 2001 WL 114936, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2001); WMA Sec. \'. Ruppen, 80 F. Supp. 2d 786, 789 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
In some cases, the firm also asserts that the individual was not an "associated person" of the firm: 
see, e.g., I lYnn, 32 I'ed. Appx. 726; Hornor, Townsend & Kent, Inc. v. Hamilton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. 
Ga. 2002). 
44. Arbitrable: see, e.g., K.W. Brown & Co. \'. McCutchen, 819 So. 2d 977, 980-81 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2002). 
45. Not arbitrable: see, e.g., Bensadoun \·.Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003); Brookstreet Sec. 
Corp. \'. Bristol Air, Inc., No. C02-0863SI, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 
2002). 
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consistently held that situations (1), (2), and (3) are arbitrable because the 
investor is considered a "customer" of either the "associated person" or 
the firm and that (4) is not arbitrable because the investor is not a 
"customer" of either. 
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson46 is one of the few decisions to 
provide much discussion of the "who decides" issue. It held that courts 
must decide whether an investor is a "customer" in instances where the 
investor is invoking arbitration under the arbitration forum's rules and 
there is no separate agreement between the parties giving the arbitrators 
authority to decide. The court believed that the need for a separate 
agreement followed from First Options and the need for "clear and 
unmistakable" evidence of the intent to confer this authority on the 
arbitrators, lest the unwilling party's "reasonable expectations" that a 
court would decide this issue be thwartedY 
What are the reasonable expectations of a brokerage firm that does 
not wish to arbitrate a claim brought by someone it asserts is not its 
customer? In instances where there is a customer agreement between 
the investor and the firm, the clear intent of the required language48 is 
that arbitrators have full power to decide all issues relating to the claim, 
including arbitrability. This, at the least, covers the category (3) cases 
above. But beyond this, brokerage firms understand that they are 
bound by applicable SRO rules that confer broad authority on the 
arbitrators to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions 
of the Code.49 NASD Rule 10106, in particular, prohibits a party from 
instituting or prosecuting any litigation against any other party "touch-
ing upon any of the matters referred to arbitration. "so 
John Hancock recognizes the SROs' authority to require their members 
to present arbitrability issues to the arbitrators,sl but maintains that the 
language must be found in a 'separate agreement with the other party to 
the dispute. This requirement is needlessly formalistic. Given the 
clarity of the language in NASD Rule 10106, the securities firms' rea-
sonable expectation should be that the arbitration panels at SRO 
forums will decide all issues, including arbitrability, arising from a 
dispute with an investor. It is hard to see how, in the case of NASD 
46. 254 F.3d 48,57 (2d Cir. 2001). 
47. ld. at 55. 
48. See discussion supra notes 27·29 and accompanying text. 
49. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10324; NYSE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 621. 
50. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10106. See UBS PaineWebber, Inc. v. Stone, No. 02· 
471,2002 U.S. Dist. LE."IS 5162 at *8 (E.D. La. l\lar. 8, 2002) (refusing firm's request for injunctive relief 
in connection with ongoing arbitration because NASD Rule 10106 prohibits the firm from bringing this 
action). . 
51. Jolm Htmcock, 254 F.3d at 57. 
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arbitrations, there could be any clearer expression of intent than NASD 
Rule 10106. 
In the main, courts have decided arbitrability issues correctly. 
Investors are harmed, nonetheless, by the delay and expense caused 
. when firms bring litigation contesting arbitration. In John Hancock, for 
example, while the court ultimately ordered the firm to arbitrate claims 
commenced by customers of the firm's "associated person" in late 1999 
and early 2000, it was not until mid-20m that the Second Circuit issued 
its opinion affirming the district court's order compelling arbitration. 
Fraudulent Conveyance Claims 
It is common in the securities industry for brokerage firms to go out 
of business and leave arbitration awards against them unpaid.52 Inves-
tors holding unpaid awards have few options, but if they can establish 
that the firm, prior to closing its doors, transferred assets to its principals 
to evade creditors, they can bring another arbitration claim against the 
defunct firm's principals on fraudulent conveyance grounds. The 
difficulties of this option are illustrated in Miller v. Flume,53 where the 
investors obtained an $180,000 award against the firm in early 1994. 
The firm ceased operations while its motion to vacate the award was 
pending, and it did not pay the award when it was confirmed in 1995. 
The investors then commenced arbitration against the principals, 
charging fraudulent transfer of the defunct firm's assets. The principals, 
however, persuaded the federal district court to enjoin the arbitration, 
successfully arguing that the investors were no longer customers and that 
a fraudulent conveyance claim was not a claim arising in connection 
with the firm's securities business. The Seventh Circuit, relying on 
NASD Rule 10301, reversed on both grounds.54 More than two years 
after the investors had instituted the second arbitration (and four years 
after obtaining the original award), they were finally able to proceed 
with their only chance at collection. 
Although the Seventh Circuit was correct in finding the matter 
arbitrable, it made the same mistake as the John Hancock court and held 
that First Options required the court, rather than the arbitrators, to decide 
52. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued three reports in four years on 
the problem of unpaid securities arbitration awards: SecuriJies Arbitration: Actions .Needed to Address the Problem if 
Unpaid Awards, GGD-00-115 (Wash. D.C.June 15,2000); Emluation if Steps Taken to Address the Problem if 
UnpaidArbitrationAwards, GAO-01-654R (Wash. D.C. Apr. 27, 2001), and Follow-Up Report on Mat/ers Relating 
to SecuriJies Arbitration, GAO-03-162R (Wash. D.C. Apr. 11,2003), all m'ailable at http://www.gao.gov (last 
visited June 26, 2003). 
53. 139 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1998). 
54. See discussion supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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the question of arbitrability. Even though the court recognized that the 
language of the NASD Code could be interpreted to confer power on 
the arbitrators to decide the question, it did not find the language 
sufficiently "clear and unmistakable" to meet the First Options test. 55 
Successor-in-Interest Liability Claims 
When a brokerage firm discontinues business, another firm may 
purchase its business operations with the expectation that the customers 
of the transferor firm will move their accounts to the transferee firm. 
These transactions are typically structured as a sale of assets, and the 
purchase agreements state that the purchaser assumes no liability for 
any customers' claims against the seller. Notwithstanding this dis-
claimer, in some instances, liability may be imposed on the purchaser 
based upon common law principles as a successor-in-interest to the 
transferor firm. 56 When customers bring arbitrations against successor 
firms, the firms frequently seek judicial determination that they cannot 
be held liable on this basis, sometimes even after the arbitrators have 
already declined to dismiss the claims. Unfortunately, every court save 
one that has considered this question has summarily treated this as a 
question of arbitrability to be decided by the court. 57 Moreover, unlike 
the previous two categories-definition of customer and fraudulent 
conveyance claims--the courts have been reluctant to find successor 
claims arbitrable. 
J1iheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green58 is the leading case on successor-in-
interest liability. Even though the investors had transferred their 
accounts to the firm purchasing the assets, the court held that they could 
55. A-filler, 139 F.3d at 1134. The court's analysis is also questionable because of its substantial 
reliance on pre-Howsam Seventh Circuit precedent holding that courts should decide eligibility rule issues. 
56. A court will impose liability on a successor-in-interest theory if( I) the purchaser agreed to assume 
the debt, (2) there was a defacto merger of the two corporations, (3) the purchaser was a mere continuation 
of the seller, or (4) the transaction was fraudulent. Set Wheat, First Sec., Inc. v. Green, 993 F.2d 814, 821 
(11th Cir. 1993); Ryan Beck & Co. v. Campbell, No. 02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
2,2002). 
57. See Grun, 993 F.2d at 819; Ryan Beck & Co. v. Faust, No. 03-CV-636 (W.D. Pa.l\-Iay 7, 2003) 
(unpublished opinion on file with author), /mer case 2003 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 15164 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2003); 
Campbell, No. 02 C 7016,2002 WL 31696792, at *2, /mer case 2003 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 17428 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
2003); Prudential Sec. v. Bellomo, No. C-97-0020 SI, 1997 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 8775, at *7 (N.D. Cal.June 
6,1997); Gruntal & Co. v. Steinberg, 843 F. Supp. 1,9 (D. NJ. 1994),qffd, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Prudential Sec. v. Dusch, No. 93-1 470-IEG (RBB), 1994 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 21623, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
28, 1994). But see Ryan, Beck & Co. v. Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that arbitrators 
could decide arbitrability if investors became customers of the successor firm), /mer case 275 F. Supp. 2d 393 
(E.D.N.Y.2003). 
58. 993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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not demand arbitration as customers under NASD Rule 10301,59 
interpreting the rule to apply only to customers of the firm at the time 
of the complained-of activity. According to the court, any obligation on 
the part of the purchaser firm to arbitrate claims arising under the 
seller's accounts had to be found either through interpretation of the 
asset purchase agreement or through application of common law 
principles, responsibilities that belonged to the courts.60 Implicit in the 
court's reasoning is a skepticism that the arbitrators will get it right. 
The court's rationale for interpreting NASD Rule 1030 I to apply 
only to customers at the time of the complained-of activity was fair 
notice to the firm: "[\'V]e cannot imagine that any NASD member 
would have contemplated that its NASD membership alone would 
require it to arbitrate claims which arose while a claimant was a 
customer of another member merely because the claimant subsequendy 
became its customer.,,61 Why is this so unimaginable? In instances 
where the investor does not transfer his account, then perhaps Green is 
correct that it would be unfair to require the purchaser to arbitrate 
claims against someone who was never its customer;62 although a firm 
that purchases assets from another firm that is ceasing operations, with 
the expectation of taking over its customers' accounts, perhaps should 
be on notice that any customer of the defunct firm may pursue a 
successor-in-interest arbitration claim against it. But the facts in Green 
are stronger than the court concedes because the investors became 
customers of the successor firm and alleged that the wrongdoing 
continued after the transfer. 
The district court in Ryan, Beck & Co., UC v. Fakih,63 in contrast, 
arrived at a better decision. It rejected Green's narrow interpretation of 
Rule 10301 and held that, as to the investors who transferred their 
accounts to the purchaser, the arbitrators would decide the question of 
arbitrability. The court, however, refused to extend Rule 1030 I to 
encompass claims of an investor who closed his account with the seller 
a year before the sale of assets. In the latter instance, the court would 
decide whether the investor could arbitrate the claim against the 
transferee firm on a successor-in-interest theory. 
Green's refusal to allow the arbitrators to decide whether ~o impose 
liability on a successor-in-interest theory caused a delay in the arbitra-
59. Id. at 820; see discussion supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
60. /d. at 819 (stating that U[t]he district coun correctly concluded that it should not turn this 
responsibility over to the arbitrators".) 
61. /d. at 820. 
62. The coun in Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210, makes this distinction. The investors in Campbell, No. 
02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, and Stdnberg, 854 F. Supp. 324, did not transfer their accounts. 
63. 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.n.N.Y.June 23, 2003). 
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tion of all claims until conclusion of the firm's lawsuit, which resulted in 
the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the arbitrator from hearing 
claims prior to the transfer of the account, but allowing arbitration of 
the post-transfer claims. Surely any benefit of narrowing the arbitration 
claims is not worth the expenditure of judicial resources and the delay 
in arbitration. The courts should refer successor-in-interest claims to the 
arbitrators and trust them to make the right decision. 
Summary 
Courts should recognize that SRO rules provide clear expression of 
the intent that arbitrators will decide arbitrability issues and that broker-
age firms have fair notice that arbitrators will decide these questions. 
Judicial resolution of arbitrability issues results in unwarranted delays 
(frequently of years) in the submission of the matter to arbitration. 
While previously an argument might have been made that courts should 
decide arbitrability issues in order to generate precedent,64 there is now 
sufficient case law to provide guidance to arbitrators. Indeed, the types 
of issues that tend to occur in this area are not legal or policy questions 
where judicial involvement would provide added value, but are rather 
technical and intensely factual issues best left to the arbitrators, who are 
assumedly familiar with the field. 65 
Merits-Based Groundsfor Enjoining Securities Arbitrations 
Courts have not limited their involvement in ongoing arbitrations to 
arbitrability questions. They have also impermissibly enjoined securities 
arbitrations on merits-based grounds that should be decided by 
arbitrators. In this section, I look at three areas where courts have inter-
fered: dismissal on the merits, res judicata/ collateral estoppel defenses, 
and New York's statute of limitations. 
Dismissal on the Merits 
If a customer brings an arbitration against a firm and the firm 
believes it has a complete defense to the customer's complaint, the firm 
should raise the defense in the arbitration, in a dispositive motion if 
64. The privatization of broker -dealer law and its effect on securities arbitration is discussed in Black 
& G ross, supra note 9, at 1013-1030. 
65. See, e.g., Bensadoun v.Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding to trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the investors were customers). 
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appropriate. 66 On occasion, unfortunately, courts accept the firm's 
invitation to decide the case on the merits and enjoin arbitration. In 
Merrilll:Jnch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Green,67 the firm sought to 
enjoin an arbitration brought by a customer who felt aggrieved because 
the firm reported suspicious activities in his account to federal authori-
ties without notifying him. Because a federal banking statute expressly 
immunized the firm from liability, the court refused to allow the 
arbitration to go forward. Similarly, in WFC Commodities Corp. v. Alston,68 
the firm was successful in enjoining the customer's arbitration because 
the court found that the claim was time-barred under a one-year 
limitations period contained in the customer agreement. 
Brokerage firms have no right to expect judicial protection from 
arbitration. If it is so clear that the defense must prevail, the broker 
should win the arbitration expeditiously. Moreover, the risk oflosing 
because the decision-maker "got it wrong" is a possibility all parties face 
in either arbitration or litigation. Courts that take away legal issues 
from the arbitrators reflect an inappropriate suspicion that the arbitra-
tors will not arrive at the right result. 
Res J udicatal Collateral Estoppel Defenses 
Res judicata or collateral estoppel principles may bar arbitration of 
issues previously contested in either litigation or arbitration. In address-
ing the question of who decides the preclusive effect of a prior judgment 
or an arbitration award, courts frequently treat the two questions 
differently. 
A distinctly minority position is that the preclusive effect of a prior 
judgment is a merits-related defense like any other that arbitrators 
decide.69 Most federal courts70 and some state COUrts,71 however, express 
66. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Vennonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 200 I) (holding that arbitrators can 
dispose of legal matters on dispositive motions). 
67. 936 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (also finding that customer waived his right to arbitrate 
by his previous actions). 
68. No. OOC0044, 2000 WL 33534178, at * I (N.D. III. I\-lar. 8, 2000) (treating this as an 
arbitrability issue, pre-Howsam). 
69. See, e.g.,U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1996). Compare 
Hooven'. Prudential Sec., No. C-3-0 1-331, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17307 (Aug. 5, 2003)(deciding that its 
prior judgment did not bar arbitration, but recognizing that arbitrators may decide this issue under Howsam). 
70. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 1998);ln re Y 
& A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993). 
71. See, e.g., Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So. 2d 158, 163-
64 (Ala. 2001), cer/. denied, 535 U.S. 987 (2002). 
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a strong policy to protect their own judgments; accordingly, only the 
court rendering the judgment should determine its preclusive effect. 
Some courts similarly believe that the preclusive effect of a prior 
arbitration award is an issue so important that only courts can decide 
it.72 The better view, however, is that since the institutional concerns 
raised when the prior decision is ajudgment are absent in this situation, 
there is no reason to treat the preclusive effect of prior arbitration 
awards differently from any other merits-based defense. Because the 
SRO rules give broad authority to arbitrators to decide all issues, the 
courts should not involve themselves in a matter that the panel in an 
ongoing arbitration can resolve.73 
New York Statute of Limitations 
Howsam made clear that ordinarily arbitrators decide procedural 
issues like statute of limitations.74 IIi New York, however, the state 
arbitration statute provides that a party to an arbitration may ask the 
court to determine if arbitration is barred by the statute oflimitations.75 
While the statute by its terms does not take away the arbitrators' power 
to decide the issue as well, New York's highest court has stated that 
under New York law "statutory time limitations . . . as opposed to 
contractual time limitations agreed upon by the parties-are for the 
courts, not the arbitrators" to decide.76 Two district courts have 
addressed the issue of whether firms, by including in their customer 
agreements a New York choice oflaw clause specifically applicable to 
arbitration,77 can require judicial resolution of statute of limitations 
issues, and reached different results. 
72. Set, e.g., Waterfront Marine Constr., Inc. v. N. End 4gers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, Band 
C, 251 Va. 417,433 (1996). Many courts do not pro~ide any explanation of why they, instead of the arbitra-
tors, should decide preclusion issues, see, e.g., Tucker Anthony v. Baird, 12 F. Supp. 2d 23, 25 (D.D.C. 1998). 
73. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, 207 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); Otick, 
151 F.3d at 140; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 135 
(2d Cir. 1996); Bd. of Ed. of Patchogue-I\Iedford Union Free Sch. Dis!. v. Patchogue-Medford Congo of 
Teachers, 399 N.E.2d 1143, 1144 (N.Y. 1979). 
74. 537 U.S. 79,84 (2002). 
75. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7502(b), 7503(a) (McKinney 2003). 
76. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308, 1313 (N.Y. 1995); but see Smith 
Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Sacha row, 689 N.E.2d 884, 889 (N.Y. 1997) Oimiting Luc~ie to choice-of-Iaw 
provisions that are applicable to both the contract's construction and its enforcement). 
77. After Mastrobuono, a general New York choice-of-Iaw clause in the customer agreement is not 
sufficient to invoke the New York Rule. See, e.g., Shaw Group v. Triplefine InCI Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 123-
25 (2d Cir. 2003); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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In Coleman & Co. Securities v. Giaquinto FamilY Trust, 78 the customer 
agreement provided that "[a]ny arbitration under this agreement shall 
be conducted pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the laws of 
the State of New York.,,79 The court found no ambiguity in the 
language and interpreted it to mean that New York's arbitration statute 
was applicable.80 It also held, relying on Volt and Mastrobuono, that the 
FAA did not preempt the state statute, since the central purpose of the 
FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced 
according to their terms.8l 
In contrast, another district court, in Dean Witter Rf!)molds, Inc. v. 
Sanchez Espada,82 found language in a customer agreement insufficiendy 
clear to warrant application of the New York rule, even though, unlike 
Coleman, the choice oflaw provision contained in the arbitration clause 
referred specifically to the statute of limitations issue: "The law of the 
State of New York will apply in all respects, including but not limited to 
determining of applicable statutes of limitation and available 
remedies.,,83 The court found this language "murky" and the firm's 
interpretation of it "strained," particularly since the agreement 
contained the NASD-required language that "[t]he parties are waiving 
their right to seek remedies in court. ,,84 
The Sanchez Espada court has the better argument in terms of contract 
interpretation. There. is not just ambiguity, but a direct conflict, 
between the waiver of a judicial remedies clause and the New York 
choice oflaw clause, if the latter is interpreted to authorize the firm to 
seek judicial determination of the statute of limitations issues. The 
NASD has made it clear that a firm's contractual assertion of the New 
York rule conflicts and contravenes the waiver of judicial remedies 
clause.85 
In sum, decisions in these three areas-fraudulent conveyance claims, 
res judicata/collateral estoppel defenses, and New York statute of 
limitations defenses-demonstrate that courts frequendy interfere with 
78. No. 00 CIV. 1632,2000 \YL 1683450, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2000),lalerdecision, 236 F. Supp. 
2d 288, 293 (S.D.N. Y. 2002) (finding customer's claims time-barred). 
79. Colmum, No. 00 CIV. 1632 (DC), 2000 WL 1683450, at *1. 
80. Id. at *4. 
81. /d. at *3. 
82. 959 F. Supp. 73 (D.P.R. 1997). 
83. Id. at 75. 
84. Id. at 82; see also supra notes 27·29 and accompanying text. 
85. "[TJhe use of a governing law clause or other clause anywhere within a customer agreement that 
thwarts any NASD arbitration provision will be deemed violative." NASD Notice to l'vlembers 95-16,supra 
note 29, at *2. 
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ongoing arbitrations and take away from the arbitrators issues that they 
should properly decide. 
PART THREE 
Increasingly, brokerage firms and individual brokers seek to vacate 
arbitration awards in favor of customers, 86 even though federal and state 
courts articulate an extremely deferential standard of review of arbitra-
tors' awards, stating that courts should vacate arbitrators' awards only 
in very unusual circumstances.87 Because the statutory grounds for 
vacatur do not lend themselves to broad interpretation, firms frequently 
assert that the arbitrators "manifestly disregarded the law," a non-
statutory ground for vacatur. Many courts recognize "manifest disre-
gard" as a basis for vacatur, although to date they seldom vacate awards 
on this ground. 
The industry's persistence in making vacatur motions on dubious 
grounds presents two problems. First, when firms and brokers consis-
tently make motions to vacate, the potential exists for overly intrusive 
judicial review, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive for finality.88 
Second, in some instances firms and brokers are making frivolous 
motions to vacate in order to delay payment to the customer or even to 
extort a lower payment in settlement. The judiciary should not provide 
assistance to practices that breach a broker's duty to deal fairly with its 
customers. 
Standard of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards 
Judicial review of arbitration awards in the federal courts is "very 
limited."89 Courts "do not sit to hear claims off actual or legal error by 
an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions oflower 
86. A comprehensive survey of motions to vacate securities arbitration awards from 1988-2000 shows 
an increase in industry challenges from 33% to 51 % and suggests that challenges may increase because of 
increased application of the manifest disregard standard. Richard P. Ryder ,SecuriJies Arbitration 2000, T odf!Y's 
Trends, Predictions for Tomorrow, SECURITIF.S ARBITRATION 2000, at 1141, 1171 (PU 2000). 
87. See, e.g., first Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Hackett v. Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 102 (N.Y. 1995). 
88. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,85 (2002). 
89. Alberti v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 205 F.3d 1321,2000 WL 19090, at *1 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished opinion) (quoting Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 
F.3d 9,12 (2d Cir. 1997). For similar language, see, e.g., Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 
2000); Spicuzza v. Sec. Serv. Network, 32 Fed. Appx. 327, 328 (9th Cir. 2002); Cohig & Assoc. v. Stamm, 
149 F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 339472, at *2 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion); Davis v. Prudential Sec., 
Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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COUrts.,,90 Furthermore, "OJimiting judicial review is necessary to 
encourage the use of arbitration as an alternative to ... litigation" and 
to achieve the "'twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes 
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation.",91 The disap-
pointed party should not be able to circumvent the parties' agreement 
to have an arbitrator decide the dispute "by the back door" of appellate 
review.92 State courts have similarly expressed a strong public policy in 
favor of finality under their state arbitration statutes.93 
Procedural Grounds 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth four process-based 
grounds for vacating an award.94 The first two involve a corrupt 
process95 or a corrupt arbitrator.96 The third addresses serious proce-
dural errors,97 and the fourth, somewhat cryptically, allows for vacatur 
"[wJhere the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.,,98 The statute also allows for correct-
ing an award for mechanical or transcription errors.99 
Brokers frequently attempt to vacate awards because the arbitrators 
refused their requests to postpone a scheduled hearinglOO or refused to 
90. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6,8 (I st Cir. 1990) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union 
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
91. Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Folkways Music 
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, III (2d Cir. 1993)). 
92. Baravati v.Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994). 
93. See, e.g., Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 102 (N.v. 1995), 
Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. App. Oiv. 1992). 
94. 9 U.S.C. § lO(a)(1-4) (2003). 
95. [d. at (a)(I) ("[w] here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means"). 
96. /d. at (a)(2) ("[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them"). See also Montez v. Prudential Sec., 260 F.3d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 200 I) (holding that arbitrator 
partiality is not established by an arbitrator's undisclosed past associations with the law firm representing one 
of the parties, dating back five years); Mariner Fin. Group v. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002) (holding 
that the arbitrator's failure to disclose that the customer's expert witness had previously testified against him 
presented factual issues as to his partiality). 
97. 9 U .S.C. § I 0(a)(3)("[w]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"). 
98. /d. at (a)(4). 
99. 9 U.S.C. § I I (c) (2003). 
100. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Testerman, 165 F.3d 911, 1998 WL 795194 at **2 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished opinion); Bisno/fv. King, 154 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (S.O.N.Y. 2001); Morrow v.Jersey Capital 
l'vlarkets Group, Inc., No. 90 CIV.5305 (RPP), 1995 WL 70630, at *2 (S.O.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1995). One 
notorious firm, Stratton Oakmont, and its principals have unsuccessfully made this argument in numerous 
district court opinions, including Shamoh v. Sclu.oeiger, 21 F. Supp. 2d 208, 211 (E.O.N.V. 1998), and Card v. 
Stratton Oakmont, 933 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Minn. 1996). 
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hear some of the proffered evidence, 101 but courts rarely vacate awards 
on these grounds. Arbitrators have broad· discretion in managing the 
arbitration process, and procedural defects are not grounds for vacating 
an award so long as the arbitration process was "fundamentally fair." 102 
Courts have also resisted efforts to interpret broadly the statutory 
ground that the arbitrators "so imperfecdy executed [their powers] that 
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made."103 For example, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
statutory requirements of finality and definiteness were "more of form 
than ... substance:,,104 the judge must confirm the award so long as he 
or she can determine that the arbitrators decided the dispute and what 
the resolution was. 105 
Similarly, challenges to awards on the ground that the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers are seldom successful. So long as the process was 
fundamentally fair, courts will confirm the award. lOG A few courts, 
however, have improperly used this ground to review the merits of a 
dispute. In Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bulls~e Securities, Inc., 107 an intra-
industry dispute, the claimant firm alleged damages resulting from 
negligence on the part of the respondent firm's employee. Because the 
101. See, e.g., Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp., No. CIV.A 97-A-MC-0053, 1998 WL 48557 at 
*2, 10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2,1998) (finding that arbitrator's comment that he would throw cases in the "trash" did 
not, in context, warrant vacatur); Steiner v. Glenn, No. 00 C 7645, 2002 WL 31133197, at *3 (N.D. III. Feb. 
2,2002). 
102. See, t.g., Bowles fin. Groupv. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013(lOth Cir. 1994); Hayne, 
Miller & Fami, Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949,952 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Plank V. Vision Ltd. P'ship, No. 02 
C 4453, 2003 WL 76864, at *2 (N.D. III.Jan. 9, 2003) (holding that a charge that the award was obtained 
through petjured or prejudicial testimony is not a basis for challenging that award, as it amounts to 
impermissible review of the arbitrator's assessment of the evidence or witnesses' credibility). 
103. 9 U.S.C. § lO(a)(4) (2003). 
104. IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001). 
105. /d. at 650-51. 
106. See, e.g., Gibbons V. Smith, 67 Fed. Appx. 52, 55, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11548, (2d Cir. 2003) 
(unpublished opinion) (confirming proceeding against absent broker who recei"ed notice of arbitration 
pursuant to SRO rules); In re Beckman v. Greentree Sec., 663 N.E.2d 886, 889-90 (N.Y. 1996) (to same 
effect); Sheldon V. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (confirming award that granted 
dispositive motion after telephonic hearing); Ashraf". Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (confirming award where the broker had no opportunity to respond to a new theory of 
damages introduced in customer's post-hearing brief); Young V. Alagna, No. CIV.A3:99-CV-2309G, 2000 
WL 472863, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2000) (confirming award where the broker was reinstated as a 
respondent after he did not appear to testify as customer's witness pursuant to an agreement). A rare 
instance of a court's vacating a customer's award on procedural grounds is N.E. N.Y. Dist. Council 
Pipefitters Welfare Fund, Local 773 v. Calapa (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County Nov. 21, 2002) (unpublished 
opinion on file with author). The broker believed that the firm's attorney was also representing him, but the 
firm had settled with the customer and apparently had not notified the broker, who received no notice about 
the hearing. The court found the arbitrators acted improperly in going forward with the arbitration without 
inquiring about the absence of the broker. 
107. 738 N.Y.S.2d 27 (App. Di\,. 2002). 
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statement of claim asserted only corporate claims, the court vacated an 
award in favor of the claimant firm's owners. 108 If the court had simply 
remanded the matter to the arbitrators for clarification or correction of 
this matter, the vacatur would be unobjectionable. The court, however, 
went further and found the award "inherently inconsistent" and 
"irrational" because it found no basis to impose liability on the respon-
dent firm since the arbitrators specifically denied the claims against the 
allegedly negligent employee. 109 
"Manifest Disregard of the Law" 
The Supreme Court, in Wilko v. Swan, 110 referred to a non-statutory 
basis for vacatur, "manifest disregard of the law," without identifYing the 
source of this standard. Although Rodriguez overruled Wilko, the Court 
subsequently referred to the manifest disregard standard as applicable 
to arbitration awards, again without explanation, in First Options qf 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan. III The manifest disregard standard, with its 
dubious origins, conflicts with the policy that the arbitrators' decision is 
final so long as the parties received a fair hearing. I 12 Nevertheless, 
almost every circuit recognizes some formulation of a manifest disregard 
standard in the context of securities arbitration awards, and many state 
courts have also adopted the manifest disregard standard under their 
state arbitration statutes. Courts consistently state that the manifest 
disregard standard is extremely narrow and "means more than error or 
misunderstanding with respect to the law.,,113 There is a strong 
presumption that the arbitrator has not acted in manifest disregard of 
the law. I 14 
There are, however, degrees of narrowness. The Seventh Circuit 
confines vacatur to awards that direct the parties to violate the law,115 
and the Fifth Circuit to awards that "would result in significant injus-
108. /d. at 28. 
J09. /d. at 29. 
110. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), ovmuled I[y Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearsonl American Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
III. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
112. The California Supreme Court provides a clear statement of this policy in MonchflTsch v. Heily & 
Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992), discussed infta note 128 and accompanying text. 
113. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). 
114. See, e.g., Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co, 304 F.3d 200, 218 (2d Cir. 2002), a non-
securities arbitration case that the Second Circuit subsequently referred to, in a securities arbitration context, 
as providing "an extensive and comprehensive recapitulation of [its] case law" on this point. Thc GJ\·IS 
Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 2003). 
115. See, e.g., Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 579-80 (7th Cir. 2000); see also 
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assoc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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tice.,,116 Unfortunately, however, most circuits allow a slightly more 
expansive review,just enough so that a firm could avoid sanctions for a 
frivolous vacatur motion. 117 
Currently applied, the manifest disregard standard does not allow for 
vacatur simply because the arbitrators misapplied the law. Rather, the 
test is designed to correct situations where the arbitrators "willfully 
flouted" the governing law. IIB The Second Circuit's two-prong test, 
with "both an objective and subjective component," demonstrates the 
difficulty in convincing a court to vacate an award under this 
standard. "9 First, the party seeking vacatur must establish that the law 
to be applied is "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.,,'20 Its 
applicability to the dispute must be "obvious and capable of being 
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve 
as an arbitrator.,,'21 Second, the party seeking vacatur must show that 
the arbitrator "appreciate [d] the existence of a clearly governing legal 
principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.,,122 Courts 
may find intentional disregard if the arbitrators' reasoning "strains 
credulity.,,'23 Other circuits have adopted similar tests. 124 
116. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Macneil, Speidel, 
& Stipanowich, 4 FEDERAL ARBITRATION L\ W §40. 7 .2.6 at 40:95 (Supp. 1999)). 
117. See, e.g., Al-Azhari v.I\Ierit Capital Assoc., NO. 99 CIV. 9795 (LAK), 2000 WL 151914, at *3 
(S.D.N.V. Feb. 14,2002) (denying customer's Rule II motion for sanctions since fi'rm's manifest disregard 
argument was weak, but "not wholly frivolous"). 
118. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 217; see also Bobker, 808 F.2d at 936-37 (finding no "manifest disregard" 
where the arbitrators did not follow the SEC's interpretation of its rule, since the record showed that the 
arbitrators carefully considered the rule's rationale). 
119. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209. In HalJigan v. Piper Jriffr'!!, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998), 
where a former employee charged the firm with age discrimination, the Second Circuit articulated an 
additional "manifest disregard of the facts" standard; Benderson, however, stated that Halligan did not create 
an additional basis for vacatur, 326 F.3d at 80. 
120. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 934). 
121. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933). 
122. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 209 (quoting Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933); see also DiRussa v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1997)(confirming a 5200,000 award to a former employee that 
did not include attorney's fees, although the relevant statute required an award of attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party, since the record did not establish that the attorney made the arbitrators aware of the law). 
123. Wesln'beire, 304 F.3d at 218 (citation omitted). 
124. In the First Circuit, the disappointed party must show that the award is "( I) unfounded in reason 
and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably 
have made such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact." 
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (lstCir. 1990). More succinctly, it requires "some showing in the 
record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it." Id. 
at 10 (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has adopted similar language;see Cohig & Assoc., v. Stamm, 149 
F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 339472, at"3 (10th Cir. 1998). According to the Fourth Circuit, the party seeking 
vacatur must show that "the arbitrators were aware of the law, understood it correctly, found it applicable 
to the case before them, and yet choose to ignore it in propounding their decision." Remmey v. 
PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Similarly, in the Sixth, Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits, to find manifest disregard, the relevant law must be "clearly defined and not subject to 
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In most securities arbitrations, the arbitrators do not state reasons in 
the award. Because of the strong presumption in favor of confirming 
awards, courts should uphold these awards so long as any colorable-or 
even "slighdy colorable"-justification supports them. 125 Courts cannot 
permit the deposition of an arbitrator in order to ascertain his or her 
thought processes in arriving at a decision. 126 If the court can find any 
"legally plausible" line of argument to support the award, it must be 
confirmed. 127 This may not be as easy for judges to do as it sounds; it 
may require them both to examine the hearing record to determine 
what facts the arbitrators could have found and to consider the relevant 
law. As some opinions demonstrate, judges can devote considerable 
effort to assure themselves that they can confirm the award, even in 
some instances remanding the award to the arbitration panel for 
clarification. 128 
State courts also restrict judicial review of arbitration awards under 
their state arbitration statutes in varying degrees. California illustrates 
the most restrictive standard. It limits judicial review of arbitration 
awards to the statutory grounds and does not recognize the manifest 
disregard standard, reasoning that the risk of arbitrator mistake is 
acceptable in light of the judicial review available for arbitrator 
corruption or serious misconduct. 129 New York takes an intermediate 
position, recognizing limited non-statutory grounds in addition to the 
reasonable debate," and the arbitrators must have consciously chosen not to apply it. Dawahare \'. Spencer, 
210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see alm Spicuzza V. Sec. Serv. Network, 32 Fed. Appx. 
327,2002 WL 460249, at *1 (9th Cir. 2002); Montes V. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (in the award the arbitrators noted the attorney's plea to disregard the law and did not repudiate 
it). 
Some Circuits have articulated additional or alternative tests: "completely irrational," see Hruban 
v. Steinman, 40 Fed. Appx. 723, 724 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and "arbitrary and capricious," see 
Brown V. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 779 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Because the 
Supreme Court has not recognized these tests, they are of even more suspect validity than "manifest 
disregard." For discussion of them, see Stephen L. Hayford, A .Nw Paradigm for CtmIlTIn'cial ArbiJraJion: 
RL/hinl.-ing the RLlationship between RLasoned Awards and IheJudicial Standardfor Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
443,489-92 (1998). 
125. Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 218. 
126. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003). 
127. l\Ierrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995). 
128. See, e.g., Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding to panel for 
clarification of the grounds for imposing liability on the CEO); Tripi V. Prudential Sec., 2003 'WL 22208351 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2003) (remanding award for clarification because it awarded customer only three per cent 
of his losses); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2003) (remanding for 
explanation of punitive damages award court viewed as excessive). For Sawtelle's subsequent history, see infta 
note 159. 
129. See Moncharsch v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 904-05 (Cal. 1992); see also Nohre v. W J. 
Gallagher & Co., No. B151769, 2002 WL 31424914, at *4 (Cal. App. Oct. 30, 2002) (confirming an award 
in favor of the customer and awarding attorneys fees because of the firm's frivolous motion to vacate). 
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statutory grounds. 130 The arbitrators' decisions on issues ofiaw and fact 
are "conclusive,,131 unless the award is "totally irrational or violative of 
a strong public policy." 132 Finally, Illinois is an example of a state that 
has adopted manifest disregard in addition to the statutory grounds. 133 
Because there are many unsettled legal questions in federal and state 
securities law,134 and because most questions oflegalliability tum upon 
sometimes complicated issues off act, including witness credibility, there 
are very few arbitrations involving customer-broker disputes where the 
broker could demonstrate that the arbitrators willfully flouted governing 
law. 135 To the contrary, in the typical customer-broker dispute, 
arbitrators hear conflicting evidence that could support a decision for 
either party.136 Consequently, as the Supreme Court stated in First 
Options, only in "very unusual circumstances" should a court vacate an 
award. 137 Case law bears this out. 138 I have found only a handful139 of 
awards vacated in customer-broker arbitrations on manifest disregard 
grounds, and most of them at the instance of the broker. Recently, 
130. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7511 (l\kKinney 2003). 
131. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 674 N.E.2d 1349, 
1354 (N.Y. 1996). 
132. Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100 (N. Y. I 995)(quoting Maross 
Constr. v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 488 N.E.2d 67, 70 (N.Y. 1985)). Some lower courts have, 
however, also adopted "manifest disregard" as a standard. See, t.g., UBS Warburg LLC v. Auerbach, Pollack 
& Richardson, Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 2002) (finding that the arbitrators "overtly 
disregarded" an SEC rule and "did not merely misinterpret it"). 
133. See Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Zielinski, 713 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ill. App. 1999). The Georgia 
legislature became the first to amend its arbitration statute to include manifest disregard as a statutory 
ground for vacatur, see 2003 Ga. Laws 363, amending GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(b). 
134. E.g., controlling person liability, liability of clearing firms to retail customers, definition of 
recommendation. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 992-93. 
135. See Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002). 
136. See, e.g., Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 1994). 
137. 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
138. I focused my research on opinions deciding motions to vacate customer-broker awards in federal 
and selected state (New York, California, Florida, and Illinois) courts fromJanuary 1995 to present. While 
I do not claim that my survey is exhaustive, it is sufficient to illustrate current trends. 
139. Several recent instances where brokers obtained vacatur or remand are discussed subsequently: 
Wallace v. Buttar, 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), discussed mfta notes 141-147 and accompanying 
text; Tacher v. Parsons, 98 CV 4482 aM) (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2000) (unpublished opinion on file with author), 
discussed mfta note 147; and Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003), discussed mfta 
notes 218-19 and accompanying text. See also Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. May, Civ. Act. No. 3:02-CV-688-S 
(W.O. Ky. Aug. 19,2003) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (vacating award in favor of customer 
as to two common law claims because customer had dismissed all claims except those based on the state 
securities statute). A recent instance where a customer obtained vacatur on non-statutory grounds isBrahham 
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 265 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725-26 (S.D. Miss. 2003), where the court found a damages 
award of approximately S 125,000 "arbitrary and capricious" because there was no "reasonable factual basis 
in the record" for the award. The firm claimed that there were no damages, and the customer's expert 
testified that damages were at least S500,000. See also Tripi v. Prudential Sec., 2003 WL 22208351 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 2003), discussed supra note 128. 
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however, some courts have begun to refer awards back to the arbitration 
panels for clarification or explanation, with a clear implication that the 
court may vacate the award on manifest disregard grounds ifit finds the 
panel's explanation unconvincing. l40 
The existence of the manifest disregard standard is dangerous because 
it gives judges an invitation to review the merits of an award and throw 
it out when they believe that the arbitrators wrongly decided the dispute. 
Wallace v. Buttar141 illustrates the dangers of judicial review under this 
standard. In that case, two investors charged that their broker made 
fraudulent misrepresentations, inducing them to purchase large blocks 
of stocks in two companies for which the broker's firm acted as the 
placement agent. The president and two director-shareholders of the 
now defunct firm l42 were successful in vacating an award that, in 
addition to imposing liability on the individual broker, found the other 
three individuals "liable for fraud and also as 'Control Persons'" under 
both federal and state securities laws. 143 The district court reviewed the 
evidence and found none that showed that the president and the two 
director-shareholders knew of the fraudulent activity-a requirement, 
in the view of the court, for controlling person liability. 144 The court did 
not believe that the evidence established the requisite intent, largely 
because the president was president in name only and supervision of the 
operations was delegated to another employee. 145 
The district court was probably wrong on the merits as to the 
controlling person liability, but, more importantly, its scope of review of 
the arbitration award was unduly intrusive. There is nothing in the 
opinion to suggest that there were any procedural deficiencies in the 
arbitration hearing, no evidence to suggest that the arbitrators were 
corrupt or even incompetent or confused. Moreover, the Second 
Circuit's "manifest disregard" test was not met under either prong: 146 
the law on controlling person liability is by no means well-defined, and 
there was no evidence that the arbitrators intended to flout the law. At 
most, the arbitrators may have stretched the law on controlling person 
liability to arrive at the conclusion that a person who holds himself out 
as president and the two shareholder/directors who brought the 
14Q. Seesupra note 128. 
141. 239 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
142. The award was vacated as to all three individuals, although it appears that only the president 
actively prosecuted the motion to vacate, and most of the court's analysis focuses on the involvement of the 
president. 
143. Wallace, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
144. ld. at 396. 
145. ld. at 394-95. 
146. See discussion supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
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transactions in question to the firm are responsible for the losses suffered 
by defrauded investors of the defunct firm. The parties received the 
arbitration they were entided to, and those disappointed with the result 
should not have been given a second chance to argue their case before 
the district court. 147 
W7ry are Firms Bringing Motions to Vacate? 
Even though motions to vacate arbitration awards in customer-broker 
disputes are rarely successful, there is a perception among investors' 
attorneys that firms increasingly are fIling them. In this section I look 
at reasons why firms bring vacatur motions. I also argue that brokers 
violate the duty of fair dealing that they owe their customers (including 
former customers) when they bring motions to vacate to delay payment 
of awards. Finally, I propose reforms to deal with the problem. 
Manifest disregard is intended to address a form of arbitrator 
misconduct, not to provide judicial illumination on unsetded or cutting-
edge legal questions. Nevertheless, brokers frequendy seek vacatur on 
manifest disregard grounds where there is scant controlling legal 
authority. Awards in this category include those allowing customers of 
the introducing broker to recover damages from the clearing firm, 148 
allowing clients of an investment advisor to recover damages from the 
broker,149 awarding damages to a "day-trader,,,15o and allowing an 
institutional investor engaged in "desperate speculation" to recover 
when the broker provided no investment advice. 151 In all these cases, 
the arbitration awards were confirmed. Brokers have so frequendy 
challenged awards of punitive damages and attorney's fees that these 
categories warrant more detailed analysis. 
147. Wallace, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 397. For another misapplication of the manifest disregard standard, 
see Tacher v. Parsons, 98 CV 4482 01\1) (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2000) (unpublished opinion on file with author), 
where the court vacated an award of approximately S 1.4 million. Even though it correctly stated the two· 
prong test that requires finding the arbitrators flouted the law," the court found only that the panel 
apparently committed a "gross error" in applying South Carolina law of damages when the customer 
agreement contained a New York choice oflaw clause. 
148. See, e.g., Koruga v. Fisef\' Correspondent Sef\'" 40 Fed. Appx. 364, 366 (9th Cir. 2002); McDaniel 
v. Bear Steams & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); RPR Clearing, a Div. of Rauscher 
Pierce Refsnes, v. Glass, No. 97 CIV.0017 JSM, 1997 WL460717, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.July 28, 1997); Cohen 
v.J.B. Oxford & Co., No. C-I-02-57I, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21177, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2002). 
149. See, e.g., Bear Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 23 Fed. Appx. 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2001). 
150. See, e.g., Rosati v. Bekhor, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 200 I). 
151. See, e.g., Investors Equity Life Ins. Co. of Hawaii v. ADM Inv. Sef\'" I Fed. Appx. 709, 1997 WL 
33100645, at *9, II (D. Haw. Dec. 15, 1997), <!I1'd, I Fed. Appx. 709,2001 WL 32048 (9th Cir.Jan. 12, 
2001). 
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One constant over the years has been the efforts of brokerage firms 
to vacate customers' awards containing punitive damages; only their 
arguments have changed. Pre-Mastrobuono,152 brokers argued that 
. arbitrators did not have the authority to award punitive damages under 
applicable state law. Post-Mastrobuono, brokers continued their efforts to 
. vacate punitive damages awards on manifest disregard grounds, 153 either 
because the applicable statute did not authorize them 154 or because the 
evidence did not support them. 155 Since Mastrobuono, these efforts have 
been consistendy unsuccessful. 
Mter BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,156 in which the Supreme 
Court held that there are due process limits on punitive damages ver-
dicts, brokers have sought to vacate "excessive" punitive damages 
awards on constitutional grounds. Most courts have rejected this argu-
ment, finding no "state action" present in SRO arbitrations l57 and 
noting that the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is 
incompatible with the Gore analysis. 158 A recent New York state court 
opinion, however, vacated a punitive damages award as excessive in a 
non-customer securities arbitration context. 159 While finding no con-
stitutional constraint, the court looked to the Gore factors to find that the 
152. See discussion supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
153. See, e.g.,R. Allen Fox, Ltd. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. 93 C 2228, 1996 WL 288771, at *2 
(N.D. III. May 29, 1996); Greening v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. C-95-4288 SI, 1996 WL 61095, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1996), '!I1'd, No. 96-15370, 113 F.3d 1241, 1997 'II'L 222341 (unpublished opinion; 
affirmed as to individual respondent); Commonwealth Assoc. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) 
154. See, e.g., Sav-A-Tripv. Belfort, 164 F.3d 1137, I 139-40 (8th Cir. 1999); Bamesv. Logan, 122 F.3d 
820,823 (9th Cir. \997); R.C. Layne Constr. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 651 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (App. Div. 
1996); Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Neurosurgical Assoc. oflnd. 896 F. Supp. 844, 848 (S.D. Ind. 1995); 
Wilson v. Sterling Foster & Co., No. 98 C 2733, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16913, at *19 (N.D. III. Oct. 15, 
1998 );Jeppsen v. Piper,Jalfray & Hopwood, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Utah 1995). 
155. See, e.g., Cmty. Hosp. of Springfield & Clark County v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 
863,876 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
156. 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 
1513, 1524-26 (2003) (holding that 5145 milli~n punitive damages award on 51 million compensatory 
damages violated due process). 
157. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., 59 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that "the federal 
policy favoring arbitration, as well as the absence of the bias and runaway punitive awards prevalent in the 
jury context, distinguish the arbitral award ... from the jury award of punitive damages"); Olde Discount 
Corp. v. Dartley, No. 604507/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 726, at *17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 1997). 
158. See l\Iorgan Keegan & Co. v. Lalonde, No. CIV. A. 00-2520, 200 I WL 43600, at * I (E.D. La. 
Jan. 16,2001). 
159. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 273-74 (App. Div. 2003). The court 
also remanded the matter to the panel for reconsideration of punitive damages. The panel subsequently 
issued a "revised" award that awarded the same amount of punitive damages that the court found excessive. 
See Susanne Craig, Panel RnnstnJes Prmitive Award Against lVaddel4 WAll. ST.j., Sept. 8, 2003, C-5. The court 
again vacated the punitive damages award and directed a new panel to consider the issue. Sawtelle v. 
Waddell & Reed, Inc., Index No. 115056/0 I (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 22,2004) (unpublished opinion on file with 
author). 
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punitive damages were excessive and therefore in manifest disregard of 
the law. This opinion, unfortunately, will only encourage firms to 
persist in their challenges to punitive damages awards in customer cases. 
Brokers frequendy seek to vacate awards of attorney's fees to custo-
mers on the ground that the "American rule" does not permit the award 
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party without statutory authority. 160 
Most courts have upheld these awards, reasoning that the arbitrators' 
broad discretion in determining remedies includes awarding attorney's 
fees. 161 In an anomalous decision in an intra-industry securities arbitra-
tion award, a New York state court found that the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers in awarding attorney's fees since the parties' agreement 
only provided that the other party could recover them. 162 Again, it 
would be unfortunate if this encouraged firms to continue to challenge 
awards of attorney's fees. 
Given the inapplicability of the manifest disregard standard to 
cutting-edge issues, as demonstrated by the courts' consistent rejection 
of it, brokers should not continue to challenge awards in similar circum-
stances. If the firm wishes judicial determination of its liability, it should 
negotiate with the customer for judicial resolution of the dispute in lieu 
of arbitration. 
Brokers apparendy challenge some customers' awards simply because 
they believe that the arbitrators reached the wrong result. In The GMS 
Group, ILC v. Benderson,163 the arbitration panel awarded the customer 
$150,000, a modest recovery considering the customer claimed approxi-
mately $1.5 million in losses. The firm nevertheless brought an 
unsuccessful motion to vacate for the purpose, as the Second Circuit 
noted, of rearguing the disputed factual and legal issues. In response to 
the firm's argument that where federal statutory rights were involved the 
Second Circuit's deferential standard was inappropriate, the court tardy 
160. See, e.g., WI\.fA Sec. v. Wynn, 105 F. Supp. 2d 833, 839 (S.D. Ohio 2000), r!fJ'd, 32 Fed. Appx. 
726,730 (6th Cir. 2002); Waddle v. LT Lawrence & Co., No. 98 C 5015, 1998 WL 901687, at *5 (N.D. III. 
Dec. 17, 1998). 
161. See. e.g., Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, 336 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2003); Bialecki v. Patterson 
Travis, Inc., No. 00C5520, 2001 WL 333076, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2001); Mutual Servo Corp. \". 
Spaulding, 972 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (N.D. III. 1997); RAS Sec. Corp. \ .. Williams, 674 N.Y.S.2d 303,303 
(App.Div. 1998) (imposing Rule II sanctions for frivolous vacatur motion). Bul Sf' Quick & Reilly, Inc. \". 
Zielinski, 306 Ill. App.3d 93 (1999) (vacating award of attorney's fees because arbitrators exceeded their 
power). Where the agreement does not provide for attorney's fees, florida requires the arbitration award 
to provide the basis for awarding them and judicial determination of entitlement. See Moser v. Barron Chase 
Sec., 783 So. 2d 231, 237 (fla. 2001). 
162. UBS Warburg LLC \". Auerbach, Pollack & Richardson, Inc., 744 N.Y.S.2d 364, 364-65 (App. 
Div. 2002). The coun also vacated the award of damages because it found "manifest disregard" of the SEC's 
net capital rule. 
163. 326 F.3d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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. observed that "any solicitousness the [Supreme] Court has expressed for 
a party's substantive rights in arbitration was on behalf of claimants under 
federal statutes, not defendants like GMS.,,164 
Wallace v. Buttar165 is another example where a firm sought (and 
received) a second chance to argue the issue of controlling person 
liability.166 Other instances where brokers were re-arguing the merits 
are listed in the footnote. 167 
The FAA confers power on courts to review arbitration awards for 
the limited purpose of assuring that the parties received a fair hearing, 
not to afford the disappointed party another opportunity to argue the 
merits. A firm is abusingjudicial resources and violating the customer 
agreement's commitment that arbitration is final and binding when it 
brings a vacatur motion to get a second chance to argue the merits. 
Finally, and most disturbingly, some firms appear to use motions to 
vacate simply to delay paying awards or to exert "economic coercion" 
on the customer. 168 Customers' attorneys have reported that brokers are 
164. /d. at 80. 
165. See discussion supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text. 
166. See also Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec. LLC, 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussedinfta at notes 
218-219 and accompanying text); Deciccio v. Columbo, 234 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322-23 (S.D.N.V. 2002) 
(confirming award where employees of a defunct firm challenged control person liability); Donald & Co. 
Sec., Inc. v.Jones, 704 N.Y.S.2d 242, 242 (App. Div. 2000) (confirming award where the firm argued it 
could not be found liable since no liability imposed on its employees); Yen v. Brown, No. 3:01-CV-2578-L, 
2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7350, at ·4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2002), amended 0/2002 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7665 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 29, 2002) (confirming award where individual broker asserted no personal involvement in fraud). 
167. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(firm argued statute of limitations defense); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Millar, 274 F. Supp. 
2d 70 I (W.O. Pa. 2003) (confirming customer's award and observing that even if court would have decided 
the ratification issue differently, there was no basis to find manifest disregard); Daugherty v. Wash. Square 
Sec., 271 F. Supp. 2d 681 (W.O. Pa. 2003) (confirming award despite firm's assertion investor was not a 
"customer"); Weiss, Peck & Greer v. Robinson, 2003 WL 1396436 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2003) (confirming 
customer's award even though she signed a general release); Universidad Interamericana v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 151,154 (D. P.R. 2002) (statute oflimitations);Janney l\Iontgomery Scott 
Inc. v. Oleckna, No. CIV.A.99-4307, 2000 WL 623231, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2000)(arbitrators awarded 
more in damages than value of customer's account); Rosenbaum v. Imperial Capital, 169 F. Supp. 2d 400, 
414(0. Md. 2001) (statute oflimitations); Waddle v. LT Lawrence & Co., No. 98C 5015,1998 WL 901687, 
at *5 (N.D. III. Dec. 17, 1998) (arbitrators awarded more in damages than claimed in statement of claim); 
l\Iaul v. Aznavoorian, No. C96-2965 TEH, 1997 WL 16313, at *2 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 9, 1997) (remedy may 
not conform with traditional contract principles); Liberty Sec. Corp. v. Fetcho, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1323 
(S.D. Fla. 2000) (lack of privity); Aragon Fin. Serv. v. Costa, No. 00-8077-CIV-FERGUSON (S.D. Fla. Mar. 
29,2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (arbitrators found firm, but not agent, liable); Sunpoint 
Sec. v. Porta, 192 F.R.D. 716, 720 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (contractual defenses). 
168. I have included in this category cases where the court voices the suspicion of vacatur abuse or 
there are other facts that call into question the bona fides of bringing the motion: the small amount of the 
claim; the customer had no legal representation at the arbitration; the firm did not provide the court with 
a transcript of the hearing, without which it is virtually impossible to· show "manifest disregard." 
Categorization inevitably requires subjective judgments; I have tried to give brokers every benefit of the 
doubt. 
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using the threat of filing a vacatur motion to settle with the customer for 
an amount less than the award. As an egregious example, in Freeman v. 
Arahill169 one of three respondents sharing liability for a $5,000 award in 
favor of the customer sought vacatur. The customer was represented, 
both in the simplified arbitration and in the court proceeding, by a law 
school clinic providing assistance to small investors. 
This practice is more than sharp litigation tactics. Brokerage firms 
and individual brokers owe their customers a duty of fair dealing,170 an 
ethical standard that goes beyond legal rules.17I "Good faith" is the 
governing principle 172 extending to all business-related conduct on the 
part of the broker. 173 Moreover, brokers violate their duty by engaging 
in conduct that undermines the NASD's regulatory functions and 
discourages customers from using the arbitration system. 174 Since 
See, e.g., !'I·liller v. flume, 139 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998) (while motion to vacate was 
pending, firm closed operations); Set subsequent case discussed supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text; 
Perpetual Sec., Inc. ,'. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2002), remanded to No. 00 CIV.9389(RO), 2003 
WL 1740456, at * I (S.D.N.Y. Apr. I, 2003)(S21,000 damages award; remanded for reconsideration of Rule 
II sanctions; on remand, coun imposed sanctions); Cohig & Assoc. v. Stamm, 149 F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 
339472, at * 1-2 (10th Cir. I 998)(pro se investor awarded S20,000 in simplified arbitration proceeding); Lew 
Lieberbaum & Co. ,'. Randle, 85 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (pro se customer awarded 
S50,000; no transcript of arbitration); Papayiannis v. Zelin, 205 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(S4O,000 award in simplified arbitration where broker made only a cursory denial; broker's attorney allegedly 
indicated broker would not pay the award voluntarily); AI-Azhari v. Merit Capital Assoc., No. 99 CIV. 9795 
(LAK), 2000 WL 151914, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,2000) (firm's "manifest disregard" argument is "weak"; 
broker's attorney allegedly stated he was under instructions to delay recovery); Commonwealth Assoc. v. 
Letsos,4O F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. I 999)(lack ofa complete record); Kruse v. Sands Bros. & Co., 
226 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (firm's "counter-petition to vacale ... dC"oid of any argument 
orlegal or factual suppon"); Nohre v. W J. Gallagher & Co., No. B 151769, 2002 WL 31424914, at *4 (Cal. 
App. Oct. 30, 2002) (sanctions imposed for frivolous appeal oflower coun's award confirmation). 
Many o(the decisions in this category involve Stratton Oakmont, a notorious "bad firm" that 
subsequently went into bankruptcy, and its principals and employees;see, e.g., Sav-A-Trip, Inc. v. Belfon, 164 
F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1999); Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Shamah v. Schweiger, 
21 F. Supp. 2d 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Po rush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178(E.D.N.Y. 1998); Card v. Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806 (D. Minn. 1996); Greeningv. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., No. C-95-4288 SI, 
1996 WL 61095 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1996), '!/I'd, 113 F.3d 1241, 1997 WL 222327 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(unpublished opinion; coun affirmed as to individual respondent). 
169. No. 111119/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2001) (unpublished opinion on file with author). 
Fordham's securities arbitration clinic pro\;ded representation to the claimant. 
170. Members "shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles 
of trade" in the conduct of their business. See NASD CmmUGf 2003, supra note 27, Rule 2110, Standards 
if Commercial Honor and ltincipks ifTrnde. 
171. In the Matter of the Application of Timothy L. Burkes, SEC Release No. 34-32142, 1993 WL 
119769, at *3 (Apr. 14, 1993), '!/I'd mnn., Burkes v. SEC, 29 F.3d 630, 1994 WL 386349 (9th Cir. 1994). 
172. See Buchman v. SEC, 553 F.2d 816, 821 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that "breach of contract is 
unethical conduct" if done "in bad faith"). 
173. See Henry E. Vail, 52 S.E.C. 339, 342 (1995), '!/I'd mem., Vail v. SEC, 10 I F.3d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
174. See Dept. of Enforcement v. Shvarts, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 6, at *2 (Nat'l Adjudicatory 
Council, NASD Reg.June 2, 2000) (finding that the broker's failure to comply with a court order requiring 
payment of attorney's fees and costs to customer was violation of Conduct Rule 2110). 
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continued NASD membership is conditioned upon prompt payment of 
customers' awards, m brokers are violating their obligations to their 
customers and NASD by bringing vacatur motions for the purpose of 
delaying payment. 176 The courts should not provide assistance for this 
type of activity. 
Suggested Reflnns 
Whether they are acting in good faith or bad, the propensity of firms 
to bring motions to vacate customer's awards and to argue for expanded 
judicial review cannot be underestimated. This is a serious attack on the 
finality of arbitration awards that courts should not encourage. I suggest 
four reforms to deal with this problem. First, "manifest disregard" 
should be eliminated as a basis for vacating arbitration awards. If there 
is a consensus that arbitrators too frequently arrive at results that are 
wrong on the merits, the appropriate solution is better selection and 
training of the arbitrators. Second, brokers should be required to post 
a bond with the appropriate SRO before flling a motion to vacate. This 
should both deter frivolous motions to vacate and protect the investor 
whose award remains unpaid. Third, the SROs should take disciplinary 
action against firms that bring frivolous vacatur motions, as a violation 
of the firm's duty to deal fairly with its customers. Finally, courts should 
seriously consider award of sanctions under Rule 11 for frivolous 
motions to vacate. To date, they have been reluctant to impose Rule 11 
sanctions, even when they note the weakness of the broker's vacatur 
motion. 177 
PART FOUR 
I have argued in this Article that there should be minimal judicial 
involvement in the arbitration process and that some courts, in the face 
of a firm's aggressive litigation, are exceeding the limits prescribed by 
the FAA. One's view of the appropriate level of judicial review 
necessarily depends on one's view of the fairness of the arbitration 
175. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10330(h). Set also NASD Notice to r-.kmbers 00-55, 
.tYASD Dispule Resolutian Will Require Firms II) Cn-tif; in I Vriting ThaJ Th£y Hm)e Complied I Vith ArbitratWn Awards 
Within 30 Dlrys if Receipt (Aug. 2000), I1wilable at http://cchwallstreet.com/NASD/notices (last visited July 
9,2003). 
176. A failure to pay an arbitration award is a violation of Conduct Rule 2110. See NASD Sanction 
Guidelines (1998 ed.) at 18 (Arbitration Award-Failure to Honor or Failure to Honor in a Timely Manner). 
See Shmrls, 2000 NASD Discip. LEXIS 6, at *37 n.22, 15-17, citing relevant disciplinary decisions. 
177. See discussion supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 445 2003-2004
2003] SECURITIES ARBITRA TION 445 
process. There are good reasons for concern about the proliferation of 
arbitration as the exclusive remedy for consumer and employment 
disputes, particularly if the arbitration process is not actually, or is not 
perceived as, fair. 178 In securities arbitrations the focus should be on 
whether the process is fair to the investors, not brokerage firms-the 
repeat players who control the contents of the customer agreement and 
subsidize the arbitration forums. 179 This issue has two aspects: first, a 
comparison of arbitration with litigation; and second, the fairness of the 
SRO forums. 
The difficulty in addressing the first issue is that, increasingly since 
1987, we have litde with which to compare SRO securities arbitration. 
A 2000 GAO report stated that there was no basis to make any 
conclusions about the fairness ofSRO arbitration proceedings because 
the caseloads were too small at an independent forum, the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), and in the courts. 180 In arbitration 
investors may be disadvantaged by the availability ofless discovery, and 
awards may be less than what a jury would award. 181 Investors, 
however, may have an advantage in arbitration since arbitrators are not 
bound stricdy to follow the law, which may impose significant obstacles 
to recovery.182 Ultimately, however, this is a question on which 
reasonable investors' attorneys can and do differ. 
How do the SRO forums measure up as fair arbitration forums? 
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that investors' attorneys 
find the process at least fair enough not to seek out available alterna-
tives. When SICA initiated a two-year pilot program offering non-SRO 
alternatives, there were few takers, and the program was discontinued. 183 
178. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel 
arbitration of employee's sexual harassment claim because the employer set up a process "utterly lacking in 
the rudiments of even-handedness"); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(holding that employer could not require employee to pay any part of arbitrators' fees in arbitrating statutory 
discrimination claims; also noting that "manifest disregard" assures adequate judicial review of statutory 
claims); I\kManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 458 (2d Dist. 2003) (finding fee 
allocation clause in arbitration agreement unenforceable because of risk that employee would have to pay 
expenses that he would not pay in litigation). 
179. The SEC and SRO reforms to make the arbitration forum more judicial have been driven by 
the recognition that the consent to arbitration is largely fictitious. See Richard E. Speidel, ConJract Theory and 
Securities ArbitraJion: I Yhither Consent?, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1335 (1996). 
180. See GAO Report, Securities ArbitraJion: Actions.Neetkd toAddress Probkm ,!!UnpaidAwards, GAO/GGD-
00-115, at 4 -5 (Wash. D.C.June 15,2000), m,ailahle aJ http://www.gao.gov (last visited July 9, 2003). 
181. Conventional wisdom is that arbitrators are not likely to be swayed by any anti-Wall St. biases 
of juries because they typically are business people with a familiarity with the securities industry and one 
arbitrator on the panel is from the industry, see discussion irifTa notes 204-208 and accompanying text. 
182. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 1035-1040. 
183. See SICA, Final &port-Pilot Progrmnfor .,von-SRO-Sponsored Arbitration AlternaJives (undated) (on file 
with author); Stephen G. Sneeringer, A SICA &periment· Et-aluating the .Non-SRO Forum Pilo~ SECURITIES 
ARBITRATION COM~1ENTATOR, Nov. 2002, at I. 
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In addition, an NASD-sponsored survey of participants in its arbitra-
tions over a two-year period provides some evidence that participants 
found the process fair. 184 An independent study of investors ' perceptions 
about the fairness of the arbitration process, however, is necessary to 
provide more information on this important question. 18" 
Professor Sternlight has identified the following components of 
fairness in consumer arbitration: reasonable notice that the consumer 
is entering into an arbitration agreement, an unbiased decision maker, 
the right to representation by counsel, the right to present evidence, the 
right to present one's case in a fair geographic forum, the right to 
adequate discovery, the right to adequate relief, the right to know 
something of the arbitrator's rationale, and the right to judicial 
review. 186 In addition, arbitration should cost consumers less than the 
expense of litigation, 187 particularly since the SROs have cited this as 
one of the principal benefits of arbitration. 188 How does NASD 
arbitration measure up under these criteria?189 
As to some of the above components of fairness, . there is consensus 
that the SRO process is fair. 
Reasonable Notice 
Of the various complaints about SRO arbitration, notice is not one 
of them. NASD rules mandate the form and content of the disclosure 
in the customer agreement about arbitration and its salient characteris-
tics, and require a highlighted statement drawing attention to the 
184. See Gary Tidwell etal., Party EvaluaJion qfArbitrators: An Ana[ysis qfDaJa Collectedftom.NASD Regulatibn 
Arbitrations (Aug. 5, 1999), m·ailable at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/arb_evaI99.pdf(last visited July 9, 
2003). Professor Tidwell was the Director of Neutral Training and Development for NASD Regulation at 
the time of the study. The report analyzes survey results from parties in arbitrations that were closed by 
hearing between Dec. I, 1997 and April I, 1999 (representing a response rate of 10-20% of approximately 
2000 cases) and concludes that participants believe their cases were "handled fairly and without bias." Id. 
at 3. 
185. See Michael A. Perino, REPORTTOTHESECURITIF.'>ANDE.XCHANGECOMMISSION REGARDING 
ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND NYSE SECURITIF.'> ARBITRATIONS 
33-37 (No\". 4, 2002), m'ailable aJ http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf(last visited July 9,2003). 
186. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality '!Ithe Supreme Court's Priferencefor Binding Arbitration: 
A Fresh Assessment '!IJury Tria~ SeparatUm '!I Powers, and Due Process Concern>; 72 TUL. L. REV. I, 85-98 (1997). 
187. See Public Citizen Press Release, ArbitratUm More Erpensiu 1han Court-So Cost[y 1haJ Many VICtims 
'!I Consumer Fraud, Employment Discrimination Gu:e Up (May I, 2002), l1J)ailable at http://www.citizen.org/ 
pressroom/princrelease.cfm?ID= I 098 (last visited July 9, 2003). 
188. NASD Dispute Resolution: What is Dispute Resolution? Gune 10, 2002), m'ailable aJ 
http://www.nasdadr.com/whatdr.asp (last visited July 9, 2003) (touting arbitration as a benefit to parties 
because it provides "prompt, inexpensive alternatives ... to litigation in the courts"). 
189. I focus on NASD arbitration since it handles about 90% of all securities arbitration claims, but 
the analysis would not be appreciably different for the NYSE. 
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arbitration clause immediately above the signature line. 190 The more 
troublesome issue is that customers do not have a choice about what to 
do with this information because every brokerage firm requires its 
customers to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of opening an 
account. As a policy matter, requiring investors to sign an arbitration 
agreement as a condition of opening a brokerage account may not raise 
the freedom of choice issue to the same degree as when employees are 
required to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment. The 
Supreme Court made it clear in McMahon and Rodriguez that it is not 
receptive to this unfairness argument. 191 
Right to Representation by Counsel; Right to Present Evidence 
NASD rules make clear that investors may be represented by 
counsel, 192 and there is an active and well-qualified securities arbitration 
bar. While there are legitimate concerns about the difficulties small 
investors face in obtaining representation,193 this problem is not unique 
to arbitration. Under NASD rules, arbitrators have full authority to 
decide procedural matters, including admissibility of evidence 194 and the 
number of hearing sessions. 195 
Right to Present a Case in a Fair Geographic Forum 
NASD conducts hearings at fifty locations throughout the United 
States,196 and the hearing site is determined by the customer's residence 
190. See NASD CONDUCT 2003, supra note 27, Rule 3110(1), Books and &cords. It is ironic that the 
Supreme Court struck down on preemption grounds a state statute that provided comparable notice in con· 
sumer agreements containing an arbitration clause, see Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 V.S. 681, 683 
(1996). 
191. For the Supreme Court's rejection of this argument in another consumer context, see Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 V.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding clause in passenger ticket contract requiring 
litigation of all disputes in florida), otomultd 0/ 46 App. V.S.C.A. § 183c (2003) (disallowing forum-selection 
clauses in passenger tickets). For a different approach, see Kloss v. Edward D.Jones & Co., 54 P.3d I (Mont. 
2002) (holding that customer agreement was contract of adhesion and not within customer's reasonable 
expectations; remanding for consideration of factors addressing unconscionability; also finding that broker 
had fiduciary duty to explain arbitration clause). 
192. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10316. 
193. See SEC Press Release, SEC Announces Pilot SecuritiM ArbitratUm Clinic /0 Help STtUllllm·eslors(Nov. 12, 
1997), O1Jailtzhle at http://www.sec.gov/news/pressarchive/ 1997 /97-101.txt (last visitedJuly 9, 2003) (small 
investors express concerns about difficulty in obtaining counsel to represent them in arbitration). 
194. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10323. 
195. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10315. In contrast to NASD practice, a contractual 
limitation on the length of arbitration hearings in an employee's discrimination claim was questioned, see 
Brooks v. Travelers Ins. Co., 297 F.3d 167, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2002). 
196. "NASD Dispute Resolution Establishes New Hearing Location in Newark, New Jersey," O1Jai/ahle 
at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_043.html(last visited Nov. 4, 2003). 
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at the time of the transaction. 197 Firms cannot include language in their 
customer agreements that purport to dictate the hearing location. 19B 
Right to Adequate Relief 
NASD rules do not limit the authority of arbitrators to award 
damages,199 and customer agreements cannot limit, directly or indi-
rectly, this authority.200 News reports indicate that customers' awards 
are getting larger,201 and while there continue to be skirmishes about the 
availability of punitive damages202 and attorney's fees,203 increasingly 
arbitrators are awarding them. 
The remaining fairness components require additional discussion. 
Unbiased Decision-Maker 
NASD arbitration panels generally consist of two members who are 
not affiliated with the securities industry and one industry-affiliated 
member. 204 Major post-McMahon/Rodriguez NASD reforms have 
increased the independence of the non-affiliated members and allowed 
the parties greater involvement in the selection of arbitrators.205 The 
SEC and the SROs have not, however, seriously re-examined the 
inclusion of an industry member on every panel, and some investors' 
attorneys believe that this practice builds in a pro-industry bias.206 Not 
all investors' attorneys share this opinion, however; some believe that 
industry expertise can be advantageous to a customer.207 Before the 
197. /d. at 14. 
198. See NASD Notice to I\Iembers 95-16, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
199. NASD recently withdrew a proposed rule that would have capped punitive damages awards. See 
Re: SR-NASD-97-47 Withdrawal (May 9, 2003) lWailabk at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/rf97_47_ 
wd.pdf(last visited July 9, 2003). 
200. See Alastrobuono, discussed supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; NASD Rule 3110(1), 
discussed supra notes 27, 188 and accompanying text; NASD Notice to Members 95-16, discussed supra notes 
29, 85 and accompanying text. 
201. See Ruth Simon, With Wall Street on DefensWe, Claims Against Brokrrs Surge, WALL ST.J., May 27, 
2003, at AI. 
202. See discussion supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text. 
203. See discussion supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. 
204. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule I 0308(b)( I )(B). 
205. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Notice 
of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 to Proposed Rule Change 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators in Arbitrations 
Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. 56670 (Sec. Release No. 24-40555) (Oct. 22, 1998). 
206. See Perino, supra note 185, at 30-31. 
207. David E. Robbins, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL§ 10-23 (5th ed. 200 I). 
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AAA essentially ceased operating as a securities arbitration forum,208 it 
also classified securities arbitrators as neutral or industry,209 so the 
practice is not unique to the SRO forums. In short, arbitrator expertise 
as compared to judicial impartiality is a debate for which there are 
respectable arguments on both sides.210 
Right to Adequate Discovery 
Post-McMahon/Rodriguez reforms have expanded the availability of 
discovery to parties. Theselj efforts culminated with the Discovery 
Guide, a consensus document developed by NASD and representatives 
of both the industry and investors' bar that sets forth expectations of 
what parties are entided to in discovery.211 Discovery in NASD 
arbitration, concededly, is less than that available in litigation, most 
notably with the absence of depositions except in extraordinary circum-
stances. Limitations on discovery are viewed as a greater disadvantage 
for customers, because brokers control much of the information 
necessary for customers to prove their casco The benefits of arbitration, 
on the other hand, as a more efficient and less expensive alternative to 
litigation, obviously diminish with increased discovery. This is another 
issue where reasonable attorneys can argue about the trade-off. 
Right to Know Something of the Panel's Rationale 
Awards are required to be in writini l2 and must include "a summary 
of the issues, ... the damages and other relief requested, the damages 
and other relief awarded and a statement of any other issues 
resolved.,,213 All awards are publicly available.214 Arbitrators, however, 
typically do not provide reasons in the awards. In the post-McMahon/ 
Rodriguez reforms, the SEC argued that arbitrators should provide some 
208. ElTectiveJuly I, 1999, AAA suspended its securities arbitration rules; thereafter, any securities 
disputes at AM will be arbitrated under its commercial arbitration rules. See American Arbitration Associa-
tion, Supplemmtary Proctdures for SecuritUs ArbiJratWn, l1l.'ailnhle oJ http://www.adr.org/index2.1 Jsp?JSPssid= 
I 6235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/focusAreal commercial! securities_rules.html (last visited July 9, 2003). 
209. For a comparison of NASD and AAA rules, see Cheryl Nichols, ArbiJraJor Selection oJ the NASD: 
Im'estor Perception if a Pro-SecuriJiLs Industry Bias, 15 OHIO ST.]. ON DISP. RrsoL. 63, 81-87 (1999). 
210. See Perino, supra note 185, at 42-43, for a summary of the arguments. 
211. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Granting Approval to Proposed Ru!e Change by 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Creating a Discovery Guide for Use in NASD Arbitrations, 
64 Fed. Reg. 49256 (Sec. Release No. 34-41833) (Sept. 10, 1999). 
212. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10330(a). 
213. Id. at 10330(e). 
214. /d. at 10330(1). 
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explanation for their awards; SROs resisted this, asserting it would 
change the fundamental nature of arbitration. 213 The debate continues, 
as some commentators continue to advocate for reasoned awards.216 In 
deciding motions to vacate, courts sometimes make a point of noting the 
absence of reasoning in an award, perhaps suggesting a distrust of the 
process because of this. 217 
As a practical matter, NASD arbitrators are unlikely to spend much 
time composing awards unless they are provided compensation for 
doing so. Even a brief explanation requires careful and thoughtful 
drafting, for a poorly expressed or incortiplete explanation may render 
the award vulnerable under the manifest disregard standard. Hardy v. 
Walsh Manning Securities, Inc. 218 nicely illustrates this problem. In that 
case the firm and its former CEO sought to vacate an award in the 
customer's favor that found both parties ')ointly and severally liable ... 
based on principles of respondeat superior." The district court con-
firmed the entire award even though the CEO, as an employee, could 
not be found liable under respondeat superior, since it found substantial 
evidence in the record that he was personally involved in the wrongdo-
ing. The Second Circuit, however, vacated the award with respect to 
the CEO and directed a remand to the arbitration panel for clarification 
of the grounds for imposing liability on the individual. The majority 
opinion emphasized that "substantial financial liability should not be 
imposed upon an individual without a clear basis in law.,,219 
Currently, NASD provides arbitrators with an honorarium based on 
the time they spend in hearings and not for other tasks-however time-
consuming-that do not require a hearing session with the parties.220 
Requiring arbitrators to provide reasons for their decisions, therefore, 
will increase the cost of arbitration. Is there a benefit that makes the 
cost worthwhile? My own view is that reasoned awards serve a purpose 
215. This debate is described in Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 996-1003. 
216. See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 124, at 443. 
217. The most striking example of this (in an employment discrimination arbitration) isHalligan v. Piper 
Jqffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating an award in favor of the firm that prCl\·ided no 
explanation, in the face of what the court thought was strong evidence of age discrimination). 
218. 341 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2003). 
219. /d. at 134. On remand, the arbitration panel clarified that it imposed liability on the individual 
because he was a controlling person with supervisory authority and because he actively participated in the 
fraud. The panel intended to impose respondeat superior liability only on the firm. Hardy v. Walsh 
Manning Sec., Arbitrator's Response (Nov. 10,2003) (copy on file with author). 
220. NASD arbitrators are paid a S200 honorarium for each hearing session (no more than 4 hours); 
a business day typically consists of two hearing sessions, and the Chair receives an additional S75 per day. 
See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Il\I-1 0 104 (Arbitrators' Honorarium) and Rule I 0332(b) (Schedule of 
Fees for Customer Disputes). These rates are lower than those at other commercial arbitration forums;see 
Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Ser .... , 105 F.3d 1465, 1481 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that "fees of5500 or $600 
per hour are not uncommon"). 
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if one wishes to create a system where they are used as precede~t221 or 
where they are routinely reviewed by the courts. Since I believe both 
practices antithetical to arbitration, I oppose requiring arbitrators to 
state their reasoning in awards. 
Others argue that there are more intangible benefits of reasoned 
awards. Some assert that parties "deserve" an explanation,222 a recogni-
tion that parties may well be dissatisfied with a system that decides 
major decisions in their lives without explanation. Professor Hayford 
argues that the need for an explanation may be driving many vacatur 
motions and that reasoned awards could reduce their number.223 Based 
on my analysis of why firms bring motions to vacate,224 I am skeptical 
that reasoned awards would abate the firms' challenges. 
Arbitration Costs 
Considerable concern has been expressed about whether arbitration 
is truly a less expensive alternative to litigation for the consumer. The 
D.C Circuit held, in Cole v. Burns International Securiry Senrices,225 that 
employees bringing statutory discrimination claims could not be 
required to pay any part of the arbitrator's fees because litigants do not 
have to pay judges. Moreover, the court expressed doubt in general 
about whether beneficiaries of statutory rights should ever have to pay 
arbitrators' fees. 226 Subsequendy, in Green Tree Financial Corp. - Alabama 
v. Randolph, 227 the Supreme Court recognized that high arbitration costs 
could prevent consumers from vindicating their statutory rights, but 
refused to deny enforceability bf an arbitration agreement on this 
ground because the consumer did not establish those costs.228 Mter 
Green Tree the circuits have developed tests for determining excessive 
arbitration costs, principally in the context of employment disputes.229 
Generally, they have rejeCted Cole's per se approach in favor of a case-
221. See EI Dorado Tech. Serv., Inc. v; Union Gen. De Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317, 
321 (1st Cir. 1992); but see Wallace v. Buttar, supra note 139, that cited an arbitration award as precedent 
without explanation. 
222. D.<WID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL, at 13-14 (5th ed. 2001). 
223. Hayford, supra note 124, at 472. 
224. See discussion supra notes 146-167 and accompanying text. 
225. 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997);seeaLro McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 134 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 446,457-58 (2d Dis!. 2003). 
226. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484. Other circuits have rejected the per se rule against fee-splitting 
arrangements; for a re'lew of the law both pre- and post- Green Tree, see generally Musnick v. King Motor 
Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003). 
227. 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000), '!ff'd 244 F.3d 814{llth Cir. 2001). 
228. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91. 
229. See Mumick,325 F.3d at 1259. 
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by-case analysis set forth in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor .$ystems, Inc. 230 
This analysis focuses on "the claimant's ability to pay, ... the expected 
cost differential between arbitration and litigation, ... and whether that 
cost differential is so substantial" that it would deter arbitration.231 
Some district courts have enjoined arbitration of consumer disputes, 
finding that consumers have met their burden under Green Tree of 
establishing that prohibitive arbitration costs would deter them from 
pursuing federal statutory claims.232 
Could an investor challenge SRO arbitration on grounds of excessive 
costs? Federal courts have not recognized a concern for arbitration costs 
outside of the area offederal statutory claims,233 thereby excluding from 
consideration investors that assert only common-law claims against their 
brokers. At NASD, investors are required, upon commencement of a 
claim, to pay a nonrefundable filing fee that varies according to the 
amount of the claim,234 as well as a hearing session deposit that also 
varies with the amount of the claim.235 Fees may be waived upon a 
showing of hardship, 236 and arbitrators, at the conclusion of the hearing, 
have the authority to allocate the cost of the hearing sessions among the 
parties in any way they see fit. 237 The costs can be considerable. On the 
other hand, claimants may benefit substantially from lower attorney 
costs in arbitration, as discovery is more limited in arbitration, deposi-
tions are rarely conducted, and motion practice is less frequent.238 An 
independent comparison of the costs to investors between arbitration 
and litigation is necessary before conclusions, even tentative ones, can 
be made. To date at least, investors' Green Tree challenges to SRO 
arbitration have not been well-received.239 
230. 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). 
231. /d. at 556. 
232. See, e.g., Hurdle v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 02-2788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18357, at *21-
23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002) (finding that arbitration fee of S7 50 would be prohibitive, since the court had 
previously found the consumer could not afford a $150 court filing fee); Arnold v. Goldstar Fin. Sys., Inc., 
No. 01 C 7694, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15564, at *34-37 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002)(findingthat a S750 filing 
fee plus one-half of estimated S3600 arbitrator's fee was prohibitive, compared to S 150 court filing fee). 
233. See, e.g., Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821,825 (D.C. Cir. 200 I) (distinguishing Cole). 
234. The minimum filing fee is S25 for a claim ofSI,OOO or less; the maximum is S600 for claims of 
more than $3 million. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10332. 
235. For three-member panels, the hearing session deposit ranges from S600 to S I ,200. See id. 
236. See NASD CODE 2003, supra note 19, Rule 10332(a). 
237. /d. at 10332(c). 
238. Many investors' attorneys do not charge their clients on a hourly basis, but collect their fees on 
a contingency basis, as a percentage of the recovery, so savings of attorney time may not directly affect the 
cost to the investor. 
239. See Ritch v. Eaton, No. CIV.A.02-7689, 2002 WL 32107628, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2002) 
(finding that a $1425 filing fee, compared with a $97.50 court filing fee, was not prohibitive; customer had 
substantial investment portfolio, and the comparison did not take into account other litigation costs). 
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Right to Judicial Review 
As discussed above,240 the FAA provides limited judicial review of 
arbitration awards to assure that the process was fair. In my view, 
increased judicial review is only warranted if one has reasonable 
concerns about the fairness of the arbitration process. While in the four 
areas just discussed, there is a need for ongoing debate about whether 
the current system meets the standards offairness to which investors are 
entitled, industry representatives do not have grounds to argue that they 
need additional judicial protection. 
CONCLUSION 
What accounts for the increased judicial tendency to involve itself in 
the securities arbitration process? First, it may reflect a continuing anti-
arbitration bias on the part of the lower courts. As discussed earlier,241 
courts uniformly take an unduly narrow view of arbitrability issues that 
arbitrators can decide. In addition, some courts are reluctant to allow 
arbitrators to decide legal issues.242 The development of the "manifest 
disregard" standard as a ground for vacatur also suggests judicial 
ambivalence toward arbitrators' having the final authority to decide the 
merits of a dispute.243 Lingering anti-arbitration bias is in sharp contrast 
with the attitude of the Supreme Court, which shows no indication of 
putting a halt to its pro-arbitration policy that gives broad authority to 
arbitrators to decide both legal244 and factual issues.245 
Second, to the extent that courts are responding to legitimate fairness 
concerns raised in the context of arbitration of employment or other 
consumer disputes,246 the transfer of these concerns to arbitration of 
customer-broker disputes is unwarranted. The SEC and the SROs have 
worked hard to make the process fair to customers; while the task is not 
240. See discussion supra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. 
241. See discussion supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text. 
242. See discussion supra notes 58-60,65-73 and accompanying text. 
243. See discussion supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text. 
244. See, e.g., McMalwn, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Rodriguez, supra note 3 and accompanying 
text; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991 )(collecting cases). See aim Green Tree 
Fin. Corp. \'. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003) (5-4) (holding that whether contracts forbid class arbitration was 
a question for the arbitrator); PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. \'. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531, 1536 (2003) (holding 
that arbitrators can interpret contractual limitation on remedies). 
245. See, e.g., l\hjor League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (200 I) (holding that 
arbitrator's "improvident, even silly" fact-finding is not a basis to refuse to confirm award, quoting United 
Paperworks Int'l Union, AFL-CIO \'. l\'lisco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)). 
246. See discussion supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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over, the brokerage industry has no grounds to assert that it is being 
treated unfairly. 
. Finally, courts unfortunately may be subconsciously perpetuating the 
anti-investor tendencies reflected in the decisions of the Supreme Court 
in the 1970s and 1980s247 and in decisions of the lower federal courts 
that constructed obstacles to investors' judicial remedies in the courtS.248 
As customer awards are getting larger,249 judicial discomfort with large 
investors' verdicts may be reasserting itself in the arbitration forum. If 
so, the lower courts insufficiently appreciate the Supreme Court's trend 
of pro-arbitration, pro-investor decisions from McMahon through 
Howsam. 
Increased judicial involvement in the securities arbitration process 
generally benefits the brokerage firms and works to the disadvantage of 
investors. First, it increases the delays and the expense of the process, 
costs that brokerage firms are generally better able to bear. Second, 
investors are more likely to benefit from equitable, rather than legalistic, 
resolution of their disputes. Arbitration is an equitable forum, and 
arbitrators should be permitted to do equity, with judicial interference 
kept to a minimum. If there is a consensus that arbitrators are applying 
too much equity and should be applying legal standards on a more 
uniform basis, then the solution is for the SROs to select and train better 
arbitrators. 
Finally, all participantS would benefit from continued improvements 
made to the securities arbitration process through the SEC and SRO 
rule-making process, which solicits input from all interested parties. 
Increased judicial involvement, however, is not likely to result in the 
improvement of the securities arbitration process from the standpoint of 
investors. Courts should implement Howsam's vision of arbitration as a 
"fair and expeditious resolution" of disputes. 
247. See discussion supra note 5. 
248. See Black & Gross, supra note 9, at 999-1005. 
249. See Simon, supra note 20 I. 
